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Welcome from the Workshop Chairs  
__________________________________________ 
 
David P. Polatty IV, MA and Albert J. Shimkus Jr., BSN, MA 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
Welcome	to	the	U.S.	Naval	War	College	and	Newport,	Rhode	Island!		We	are	deeply	
honored	to	host	you	for	two	days	of	important	and	intensive	discussions	on	civilian-military	
coordination	and	engagement	in	the	humanitarian	response	arena.		Ongoing	complex	
emergencies	in	Iraq,	Syria,	and	Yemen,	along	with	recent	natural	disasters	including	Hurricane	
Matthew	in	Haiti	and	Super	Typhoon	Haima	in	the	Philippines,	highlight	our	responsibility	as	
global	citizens	to	do	everything	in	our	power	to	advance	and	improve	civilian-military	
engagement	to	better	aid	vulnerable	people	around	the	world.		This	workshop	brings	together	
humanitarian	practitioners	and	leaders,	academicians,	and	military	leaders	to	explore	present	
and	future	challenges	in	international	military	support	to	humanitarian	responses,	including	
natural	disasters,	complex	emergencies,	and	routine	security	cooperation	activities.		
This	humanitarian-focused	event	is	designed	to	help	the	United	States	Navy,	Marine	
Corps,	Coast	Guard,	and	international	maritime	forces,	as	well	as	the	United	Nations	Office	for	
the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs	(UN	OCHA),	humanitarian	organizations,	and	
academia	collaboratively	develop	robust	research,	professional	education,	training,	and	
development	agendas.	Each	of	these	entities	plays	a	vital	role	in	helping	to	improve	civilian-
military	coordination	during	humanitarian	responses.	
This	workshop	intends	to	improve	international	military	support	to	humanitarian	responses	
by	meeting	the	following	four	objectives:	
	
1. Enhancing	the	response	capacity	of	UN	OCHA,	USAID	OFDA,	humanitarian	NGOs,	Red	
Cross	and	Red	Crescent	Movement,	international	militaries,	and	other	key	organizations	
through	supporting	a	Community	of	Practice	in	civilian-military	issues	and	promoting	
information	sharing	that	can	inform	policy	and	processes	during	humanitarian	crises.	
	
2. Expanding	and	strengthening	a	network	of	practitioners,	academics,	and	leaders	who	
routinely	work	civilian-military	engagement	in	the	humanitarian	space.	
	
3. Highlighting	key	opportunities	for	professional	education,	training,	and	development	for	
key	decision	makers	to	identify	the	best	practices	associated	with	overcoming	cultural,	
policy,	technical,	and	legal	challenges	for	coordination	and	information	sharing.	
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4. Developing	a	comprehensive	research	agenda	focused	on	civilian-military	coordination	
considering	international	approaches	to	effecting	solutions.		
	
We	hope	that	you	will	find	our	discussions	timely,	relevant,	and	meaningful,	and	that	you	
are	able	to	expand	your	network	of	leaders	from	the	humanitarian	community,	academe,	and	
militaries,	so	we	can	all	work	more	effectively	together	to	help	vulnerable	people.		Our	keynote	
addresses,	panel,	and	working	group	discussions	are	carefully	devised	to	help	improve	trust	and	
confidence	with	one	another	when	international	militaries	conduct	routine	security	
cooperation	activities	and	are	called	upon	to	respond	to	natural	disasters	and	complex	
emergencies.	The	ability	for	our	governments	and	organizations	to	respond	to	humanitarian	
crises	is	strengthened	through	the	trust	we	build	here	and	the	lessons	we	share.	
	
The	following	working	papers	and	reference	information	are	included	to	help	stimulate	
thinking,	begin	the	exchange	of	ideas,	and	provide	valuable	background	information	for	our	
diverse	and	multidisciplinary	audience.	We	hope	you	share	these	papers	with	your	colleagues	
throughout	the	humanitarian	space.	
	
Thank	you	very	much	for	participating	and	please	enjoy	your	time	in	Newport!	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
This	event	is	supported	by	the	U.S.	Naval	War	College	Foundation	(NWCF),	specifically	
through	the	generosity	of	NWCF	Life	Member,	Mr.	Edward	Polk,	and	the	U.S.	Naval	War	College	
EMC	Chair,	Dr.	Derek	Reveron.		This	workshop	would	not	have	been	possible	without	the	
amazing	work	of	our	Protocol	&	Events	Department,	Visual	Communications	Department,	
incredible	cross-college	coordination	between	the	College	of	Operational	&	Strategic	
Leadership,	National	Security	Affairs,	and	Joint	Military	Operations	faculty;	and	a	strong	and	
enduring	commitment	to	academic	excellence	by	the	Department	of	the	Navy	and	the	U.S.	
Naval	War	College.		
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Improving Military Integration and Use of Civilian 
Information Communication Technologies during 
Disaster Response 
__________________________________________ 
 
Agustín Pájaro, CDR, Chilean Navy, MS, MA 
US Naval War College 
 
In	accordance	with	the	Oslo	guidelines	on	the	use	of	foreign	military	and	civil	defense	
assets	in	disaster	relief	operations,	military	forces	should	be	used	only	as	a	last	resort.	However,	
military	forces	have	been	widely	used	as	first	responders	to	temporarily	support	an	affected	
nation	during	international	humanitarian	efforts	as	a	result	of	complex	emergencies	and	natural	
or	man-made	disasters.	Current	trends	suggest	that	the	frequency	of	such	emergencies	is	
increasing	worldwide,	generating	more	pressure	on	an	already	stressed	international	
humanitarian	system.	At	the	same	time,	from	a	governmental	perspective,	any	unnecessary	
employment	of	duplicate	assets	can	cause	misuse	of	resources	and	the	lost	opportunity	to	
apply	those	resources	to	other	missions.	Given	these	developments,	it	is	rational	to	extrapolate	
an	increased	likelihood	of	employing	military	capabilities	to	provide	additional	capability	and	
capacity	to	affected	nations	and	the	international	humanitarian	system,	when	necessary.	
	
Considering	the	current	economic	strain	on	many	nations,	it	is	imperative	for	militaries	
around	the	world	to	improve	their	effectiveness	and	efficiency	in	the	conduct	of	Humanitarian	
Assistance	and	Disaster	Response	(HA/DR)	operations.	Militaries	who	routinely	respond	to	
natural	disasters	and	complex	emergencies	must	make	greater	strides	to	improve	synergy	and	
work	more	effectively	with	the	United	Nations,	inter-governmental	organizations,	non-
governmental	organizations,	and	an	affected	nation’s	government	and	military	in	order	to	
improve	crisis	response	and	save	lives.		One	area	where	militaries	should	focus	on	improving	
their	understanding	and	ability	to	integrate	into	international	humanitarian	responses	is	
through	the	use	of	civilian	information	communication	technologies	(ICTs).	
	
Why	should	militaries	have	better	access,	participation,	and	coordination	into	the	
information	and	communications	domain?	
	
• Improving	response	effectiveness.	First	responders	need	accurate,	reliable,	and	timely	
information	to	conduct	their	initial	assessment;	this	will	provide	the	basis	for	proper	
initial	planning	and	response.	Effective	initial	response	to	a	humanitarian	crisis	will	save	
more	human	lives	in	the	opening	days	of	the	crisis.	This	will	then	allow	for	better	
employment	of	limited	resources	during	the	days	immediately	following	the	initial	
lifesaving	efforts.	Enhanced	collaboration	through	the	use	of	key	ICTs,	properly	defined,	
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authorized,	organized,	and	trained,	will	be	a	factor	that	dramatically	increases	the	
capability	to	find	the	signal	(information)	from	the	level	of	noise	generated	at	these	
emergencies.	
	
• Digital	Humanitarian	Network	support	for	data	management	and	conversion	into	
actionable	information.	Global	population	connectivity	trends	allow	us	to	extrapolate	
that	during	a	near	term	future	crisis	the	volume	of	data	that	will	be	generated	and	the	
ability	to	convert	it	into	actionable	information,	will	be	unmanageable	for	a	single	
organization	without	the	cooperation	of	formal	and	informal	groups.	In	only	one	of	
many	social	media	platforms,	the	total	number	of	tweets	posted	in	four	recent	
emergencies	exceeded	53	million.1	HADR	operations	have	quickly	evolved	from	data	
scarcity	to	data	overload.				
	
Since	the	Haiti	earthquake	in	2010,	Volunteer	&	Technical	[humanitarian]	Communities	
(VTCs)	have	effectively	supported	organizations	working	on	the	ground	during	HA/DR	
operations.	VTCs	have	helped	in	many	important	areas	such	as	digital	map	construction,	
extraction	of	actionable	information	from	social	media,	translation	of	population	data	
from	SMS	texts,	production	of	crisis	maps	and	dashboards,	generation	and	analysis	of	
digital	imagery	from	commercial	satellites	and	aerial	drones,	support	to	health	
professionals	from	remote	locations	through	the	internet,	and	use	of	ICTs	to	assist	in	
finding	missing	people.					
	
Also,	these	communities	are	working	on	numerous	innovative	projects	to	introduce	
machine	learning	techniques	that	should	improve	the	filtering	process	of	relevant	
information	from	social	media	during	disasters	or	complex	emergencies.	Initiatives	such	
as	“Artificial	Intelligence	for	Digital	Response”	(AIDR)2,	partnered	with	the	United	
Nations	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs,	are	powerful	tools	to	
improve	the	understanding	of	the	situation	on	the	ground	before	the	first	responders	
reach	the	emergency	response	area.		
	
Statements	like	those	of	a	U.S.	Marine	involved	in	the	2010	Haiti	earthquake	disaster	
relief	operations	highlight	the	benefits	of	cooperation	with	civilian	VTCs:	“I	cannot	
overemphasize	to	you	the	work	of	the	Ushahidi/Haiti	[Crisis	Map]	has	provided.	It	is	
saving	lives	everyday….	Your	site	saved	these	people’s	lives…	The	Marine	Corps	is	using	
your	project	every	second	of	the	day	to	get	assistance	to	the	people	that	needed	it	
most...”	3	
                                                
1 Haiti Earthquake, 2010; Hurricane “Sandy”, 2012; Boston Marathon Bombing, 2013; Typhoon “Haiyan”, 
2013.  Tomer Simon, Avishay Goldberg & Bruria Adini, "Socializing in emergencies—A review of the use of 
social media in emergency situations," International Journal of Information Management 35, no.5 (Oct 2005): 
613. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0268401215000638  
2	See:	http://aidr.qcri.org/	
3 National Geographic, Voices, Ideas and Insights From Explorers, "How Crisis Mapping Saved Lives in 
Haiti," accessed 20 August 2016, http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2012/07/02/crisis-mapping-haiti/  
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• Information	sharing	improves	coordination	and	better	coordination	enhances	
effectiveness	and	efficiency.	There	is	extensive	empirical	evidence	detailing	
coordination	problems	between	military	forces	and	humanitarian	aid	organizations	in	
HA/DR	operations.	Military	organizations,	based	on	the	systematic	study	of	history,	are	
keenly	aware	of	the	importance	of	organized	command	and	control	in	the	effectiveness	
of	their	operations.	
	
Normally,	non-military	international	aid	organizations	are	operational	on	the	scene	long	
time	before	governments	decide	to	use	military	assets	in	HA/DR	operations.	Typically,	
NGOs	and	IGOs	possess	a	high	level	of	understanding	of	the	local	situation	in	numerous	
dimensions,	such	as	political,	infrastructure,	security,	cultural	practices,	logistics,	and	
government	capabilities.4	Respecting	the	humanitarian	principles	of	neutrality,	
impartiality,	and	independence,	this	type	of	knowledge	enables	assessment	that	is	
crucial	to	creating	synergy	among	first	responders.	Therefore,	military	responders	must	
balance	their	doctrinal	command	and	control	expectations	with	the	local	expertise	of	
the	civilian	professionals	on	the	ground	before	the	military	forces	arrive.	
	
• Practicality.	The	entry	of	military	forces	into	a	humanitarian	operation	is	usually	a	
temporary	condition,	a	last	resort	decision	duly	pondered	by	respective	governments.	In	
this	sense,	the	military	organization	must	be	integrated	into	the	humanitarian	ICT	
system	in	place;	it	is	easier	for	the	military	to	integrate	into	an	unclassified,	open,	in	
place	system	than	for	the	humanitarian	community	to	try	to	integrate	into	a	military’s	
classified,	closed	system.	Additionally,	once	the	military	leaves	the	area,	the	
humanitarian	ICT	system	must	continue	to	function	without	military	support.		
	
• Humanitarian	systems	are	better	adapted	for	HA/DR	operations.	The	temporary	
integration	of	military	forces	into	HADR	operations	is	preferred	compared	with	
employment	of	a	military	ICT	system,	designed	mainly	for	combat	operations.	The	level	
of	adaptation,	expertise,	and	specification	of	a	dedicated	operating	system,	which	
operates	365	days	a	year,	is	hard	to	match.		
	
In	any	organization	or	system,	open	or	closed,	duplication	of	effort	involves	loss	of	
synergy	and	efficiency,	which	can	also	lead	to	errors	in	execution,	with	varying	degrees	of	
consequence.	In	this	regard,	and	in	times	of	tremendous	stress	and	scarcity	of	resources,	
instead	of	introducing	more	ICTs	into	responses,	all	actors	in	the	humanitarian	space	should	
make	efforts	to	better	optimize	the	use	of	the	current	operational	ICTs,	as	well	as	well-defined	
doctrine,	procedures,	and	ethical	standards	in	order	for	all	entities	to	operate	in	an	integrated	
and	synchronized	manner	for	the	good	of	humanity	and	to	better	serve	affected	people.		
                                                
4 James McArthur et al, “Interorganizational Cooperation II of III: The Humanitarian Perspective,” Joint 
Force Quarterly 80, 1st Quarter (2016): 147. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-79/jfq-
79_106-112_McArthur-et-al.pdf.  
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Private Military and Security Companies and 
NGOs: The Role of NGO Security Contracting for 
Civil-Military Interaction 
__________________________________________ 
 
Birthe Anders, PhD 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 
 
Civil-military	interaction	in	humanitarian	emergencies	and	(post-)conflict	settings	can	be	
extremely	challenging,	partly	due	to	different	mandates,	missions	and	short-term	goals	of	the	
various	actors	involved.	Among	them	are	the	civilian	population	of	state,	local	civilian	
institutions	and	the	local	military,	as	well	as	international	military	and	civilian	actors,	such	as	
employees	of	international	organisations	or	non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs).	However,	
if	managed	successfully,	communication,	coordination	and	sometimes	cooperation	between	
military	and	civilian	actors	can	be	crucial	to	the	success	of	a	mission.	In	recent	years,	another	
actor	has	become	a	familiar	sight	in	these	settings:	Private	Military	and	Security	Companies	
(PMSCs),	that	is	private	companies	providing	military	and/or	security	services	to	a	range	of	
clients.	PMSCs	and	particularly	their	work	for	the	U.S.	government	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	have	
received	significant	public	and	scholarly	attention	in	the	past	15	years.1	A	less	publicized	aspect	
of	the	industry	is	that	NGOs	also	contract	for	security	services.2	This	is	a	daily	reality	in	many	
operational	environments	around	the	world.	This	working	paper	thus	focuses	on	a	particular	
subset	of	civil-military	interaction:	on	NGOs	and	PMSCs.		
	
NGO	Security	and	Private	Military	and	Security	Companies	
NGO	security,	meaning	the	safety	of	staff	and	assets,	has	been	a	growing	concern	for	aid	
agencies.	While	there	were	always	challenges	to	working	in	zones	of	war,	conflict,	and	natural	
disaster,	security	incidents	have	risen	significantly	in	recent	years.3	A	security	incident	is	one	in	
which	an	aid	worker	is	wounded,	killed	or	kidnapped.	For	example,	in	2013	attacks	on	aid	
workers	were	reported	to	have	increased	by	48%	compared	to	the	previous	year,	with	the	
                                                
1	See	e.g.	Krahmann,	Elke	(2010):	States,	Citizens	and	the	Privatisation	of	Security,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	
University	Press;	Dunigan,	Molly	(2011):	Victory	for	Hire.	Private	Security	Companies’	Impact	on	Military	
Effectiveness.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press;	Avant,	Deborah	D./	Sigelman,	Lee	(2010):	Private	Security	and	
Democracy:	Lessons	from	the	US	in	Iraq.	Security	Studies	19(2),	230-265.	
2	Anders,	Birthe	(2016):	What	Role	do	Private	Military	and	Security	Companies	Play	in	Securing	Humanitarian	
Organizations?,	ATHA/	Harvard	Humanitarian	Initiative	Blog,	4	July	2016.	Anders,	Birthe	(2013):	Treehugges	and	
Babykillers:	The	relationship	between	NGOs	and	PMSCs	and	its	impact	on	coordinating	actors	in	complex	
operations.	Small	Wars	&	Insurgencies	24(2),	278-294.	
3	For	a	discussion	of	reasons	for	increased	attacks	on	aid	workers,	particularly	on	why	the	traditional	acceptance	
strategy	has	become	more	challenging	to	implement,	sometimes	due	to	actions	by	aid	agencies	themselves,	see	
Stoddard,	Abby/	Harmer,	Adele/	Haver,	Katherine	(2006):	Providing	aid	in	insecure	environments:	trends	in	policy	
and	operations.	HPG	Report	23.	September	2006.	London:	Overseas	Development	Institute. 
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number	of	victims	up	by	66%.4	These	developments	have	led	some	NGOs	to	either	accept	
military	protection	or,	if	this	is	not	available,	to	contract	PMSCs	-	a	very	controversial	decision	
within	the	NGO	community.5	This	is	especially	so	as	PMSCs	work	with	what	can	be	called	‘hard’	
security	measures	such	as	armed	guards	and	armoured	vehicles.	In	contrast	to	that,	most	NGOs	
prefer	to	rely	on	the	acceptance	of	the	local	community	for	their	safety	rather	than	on	physical	
protection.	In	addition,	contracting	PMSCs	might	enable	an	NGO	to	continue	working	in	a	high-
risk	environment,	but	it	has	been	argued	that	contracting	for	armed	services	might	actually	
decrease	security	-	by	distancing	NGO	staff	from	the	local	population	and	making	it	more	likely	
for	aid	workers	to	be	attacked.	While	there	is	no	conclusive	data	to	prove	this	argument	it	is	a	
concern	from	an	NGO	perspective.	Now,	it	should	be	pointed	out	that	armed	security,	the	
service	for	which	PMSCs	are	most	known	is	only	one	part	of	NGO	contracting.	Much	more	
frequently	NGOs	contract	for	unarmed	security,	intelligence,	security	training,	kidnap	and	
ransom	advice	and	response,	travel	tracking	as	well	as	medical	evacuation.	
 
Implications	for	civil-military	interaction 
How	then	is	the	interaction	between	NGOs	and	PMSCs	relevant	in	the	broader	context	
of	civil-military	interaction,	particularly	in	humanitarian	operations?	PMSCs	add	another	layer	
to	an	already	complex	web	of	interactions.	First,	actions	by	PMSCs	could	be	attributed	to	the	
client,	in	this	case	the	NGO.	This	is	particularly	a	concern	regarding	any	unlawful	actions	by	
PMSCs,	but	also	relates	to	simpler	matters	such	as	which	roads	are	used	and	the	appropriate	
treatment	of	local	customs.	Which	other	customers	a	PMSC	works	for	can	also	be	relevant,	as	
not	only	actions	by	the	PMSC	but	also	by	other	clients	might	be	attributed	to	the	NGO.	This	
often	matters	in	warzones	where	parts	of	the	local	population	might	be	hostile	to	international	
military	presence	(including	their	contractors)	and	then	by	extension	might	be	hostile	to	the	
NGO,	but	should	matter	a	little	less	in	humanitarian	operations.	Second,	not	only	security	
services	contracted	in	the	field,	such	as	armed	and	unarmed	guards	are	relevant	here.	As	said	
above,	NGOs	contract	for	a	range	of	services,	including	security	training	and	intelligence.		How	
NGOs	are	trained	on	security	and	which	approach	to	staff	security	an	organization	takes	can	
influence	where	they	go	and	how	they	behave	there.	Third,	it	is	also	possible	for	NGO	security	
contracting	to	have	clear	positive	effects	for	military	partners,	in	particular	by	freeing	up	
military	capacity	that	would	otherwise	have	been	needed	to	secure	NGO	operations.	Almost	all	
PMSC	employees	have	a	military	or	law	enforcement	background,	meaning	they	will	likely	be	
well-versed	in	a	military’s	approach	to	operations.	At	the	same	time	PMSC	employees	will	now	
approach	their	job	from	a	business	perspective,	meaning	they	will	want	to	fulfill	their	particular	
contract	with	a	client	and	not	necessarily	think	about	the	overall	mission	of	their	clients	or	their	
partners.	Now,	as	said	above	from	an	NGO	perspective,	it	is	not	proven	that	contracting	for	
armed	services	increases	staff	security	in	all	cases,	particularly	in	the	long	term.	However,	once	
                                                
4	This	was	especially	due	to	worsening	situations	in	Syria	and	South	Sudan.	Stoddard,	Abby/	Harmer,	Adele/	Ryou,	
Kathleen	(2014):	Aid	Worker	Security	Report	2014.	Unsafe	Passage:	Road	attacks	and	their	impact	on	humanitarian	
operations.	Humanitarian	Outcomes,	August	2014,	2.	
5	The	 UN	 has	 also	 contracted	 PMSCs,	 which	 cannot	 be	 discussed	 in	 detail	 here	 due	 to	 space	 constraints.	 See	
Østensen,	 Åse	 Gilje	 (2013):	 In	 the	 Business	 of	 Peace:	 The	 Political	 Influence	 of	 Private	 Military	 and	 Security	
Companies	on	UN	Peacekeeping,	International	Peacekeeping	20(1),	33-47. 
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contracted,	PMSCs	(and	the	intelligence	they	provide)	will	need	to	be	included	into	
communication	where	appropriate.	From	a	military	perspective,	this	might	make	
communication	and	information	sharing	more	challenging,	but	knowing	who	your	partners’	
contractors	are	and	how	to	deal	with	them	can	be	crucial	to	successfully	managing	civil-military	
interaction.		
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Evaluating Military Engagement in  
Disaster Response 
__________________________________________ 
 
Vincenzo Bollettino, PhD 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 
 
With	the	world	focused	on	terrorism,	conflict	in	Syria,	Iraq,	and	elsewhere,	it	is	easy	to	
forget	about	the	threat	posed	by	natural	disasters.	Natural	disasters	pose	as	great	a	threat	as	
conflict	does	to	the	wellbeing	of	millions	of	people	across	the	globe	and	undermine	livelihoods	
by	wreaking	havoc	on	property	and	natural	resources.	Current	and	anticipated	sea	level	rise	
and	changing	patterns	in	and	increasing	severity	of	weather-related	events	pose	significant	
threats	to	populations	globally.	These	large	disasters	impact	lives	and	property	alike,	and	at	
times,	are	too	much	for	affected	states	to	manage	on	their	own.	
	
When	disaster-affected	states	are	unable	to	cope	with	the	response	and	recovery	to	
disasters	on	their	own,	they	often	turn	to	other	states	and	the	international	humanitarian	
community	to	help	manage	the	disaster	response	and	to	provide	resources	and	know-how	to	
ensure	a	quick	recovery.	Increasingly	it	is	foreign	militaries	that	are	called	to	assist	in	the	early	
days	of	disaster	response,	raising	dilemmas	about	how	long	to	use	them	and	in	what	capacity.	
In	circumstances	where	natural	disasters	hit	crisis-affected	areas	(for	example,	the	Pakistan	
floods	in	2010),	the	stakes	are	high	for	humanitarian	agencies.	
	
Arguably,	far	more	attention	needs	to	be	paid	to	disaster	preparedness,	both	to	reduce	
vulnerability	to	disasters	by	following	building	codes,	building	in	safe	areas	not	prone	to	
repeated	flooding),	but	also	to	be	better	prepared	to	respond	through	better	training,	
professionalization	of	humanitarian	response	and	greater	coordination	between	national	and	
international	humanitarian	actors.	Yet,	many	disasters	today	are	so	large	that	states	lack	
capacity	to	manage	the	immediate	response	using	civilian	capacity	alone.	This	is	where	national	
militaries,	and	at	times,	foreign	militaries	have	come	to	play	a	critical	role.	Because	militaries’	
primary	function	is	war	fighting,	this	begs	questions	about	their	involvement	in	aiding	
humanitarian	response	to	natural	disasters.	How	effective	are	militaries	in	providing	assistance?	
What	are	the	benefits/costs	to	humanitarian	agencies	of	coordinating	with	militaries?	How	do	
we	measure	the	impact	of	militaries	involvement	in	humanitarian	response?	How	do	local	
populations	view	military	engagement	in	relief	efforts?	When	multiple	foreign	militaries	
respond,	how	can	their	activities	be	most	effectively	synchronized	and	coordinated	to	
complement	relief	efforts	being	led	by	the	international	humanitarian	system?		There	is	scant	
empirical	evidence	to	answer	these	questions	fully.	Yet,	militaries	are	increasingly	being	called	
to	respond.	Governments,	humanitarian	aid	agencies,	militaries	and	donors	need	to	pay	more	
attention	to	these	dynamics	and	begin	funding	empirical	research	in	this	domain.	
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The	growing	importance	of	militaries	in	humanitarian	response	
In	recent	years,	humanitarian	needs	have	grown	steadily,	with	an	increased	number	of	
resources	needed	to	meet	the	needs	to	people	directly	affected	by	disaster.	Earthquakes	like	
the	one	in	Haiti	(2010)	and	Nepal	(2015)	or	massive	super	typhoons	like	Haiyan	which	hit	the	
Philippines	in	2013,	underscore	the	dangers	of	failing	to	prepare.	While	the	first	responders	to	
any	disaster	are	always	the	local	communities	directly	affected	by	the	disaster,	these	
communities	are	often	overwhelmed	by	large	disasters	and	require	the	support	of	neighboring	
communities	domestically,	and	many	times	by	a	diversity	of	both	domestic	and	international	
humanitarian	organizations.	Yet,	international	humanitarian	organizations	themselves	are	often	
unable	to	provide	immediate	relief	in	the	days	following	a	disaster.	It	takes	these	organizations	
time	to	get	on	the	ground,	gain	access	to	heavily	damaged	areas	and	vulnerable	populations,	
conduct	assessments	to	identify	needs,	and	bring	in	or	locally	hire	the	resources	needed	to	
provide	relief	to	those	impacted	by	the	disaster.	
	
In	many	instances	it	is	the	national	military	of	the	affected	state,	often	aided	by	foreign	
militaries	that	provide	life-saving	aid	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	a	disaster.	Militaries	have	
the	unique	capability	to	move	thousands	of	people	and	critical	supplies	and	equipment	needed,	
for	example,	to	clear	and	open	airports,	sea	ports	and	roads,	and	to	restore	essential	
infrastructure	that	would	otherwise	take	weeks	or	months	for	other	agencies	to	organize.	In	
short,	militaries	have	a	pivotal	role	to	play	in	the	early	days	of	relief	from	major	disasters	that	
surpass	the	capacity	of	the	affected	state.	At	the	same	time,	the	introduction	of	foreign	
militaries	complicates	matters,	as	these	militaries	have	to	be	integrated	into	an	already	
operational	domestic	response.	(Take	for	example	the	Philippines	in	response	to	Typhoon	
Haiyan	in	2013	where	more	than	23	foreign	militaries	provided	assistance	across	a	wide	
geographic	area).	This	means	scarce	domestic	military	resources	needed	for	the	response	have	
to	be	used	to	coordinate	foreign	militaries.	
	
Disaster	response	is	not	typically	a	military’s	primary	mission	(though	indeed,	in	a	
number	of	countries,	the	national	military	is	in	fact	mandated	to	provide	disaster	relief),	and	
unsurprisingly,	many	states	are	hesitant	to	request	aid	from	foreign	militaries.	There	are	a	
number	of	challenges	associated	with	the	engagement	of	militaries	in	disaster	response.	First,	
militaries	often	send	materials	that	they	happen	to	have	available	as	opposed	to	what	is	
needed	or	requested	on	the	ground.	Resources	should	be	“pulled”	into	the	theater	of	
operations	based	on	need,	not	“pushed”	based	on	availability.	Second,	where	militaries	do	
participate	in	disaster	relief,	there	may	be	conflicts	of	interest,	particularly	in	complex	
emergencies	where	one	or	more	of	the	militaries	may	be	simultaneously	engaged	in	the	
conflict.	In	complex	emergencies,	there	is	the	added	challenge	of	safety	and	security	of	
humanitarian	aid	workers;	as	a	result,	many	humanitarian	aid	agencies	will	seek	to	mitigate	
risks	to	their	staff	by	curtailing	their	involvement	with	militaries.	Finally,	in	large	responses	
where	multiple	foreign	militaries	and	aid	agencies	are	all	descending	to	provide	aid	at	the	same	
time,	there	can	be	competition	for	flight	rights	coming	into	an	airport,	for	storage	facilities,	and	
for	domestic	transport	to	get	resources	from	the	airport	to	dispersed	areas	of	need.	These	
challenges	make	it	paramount	to	have	clear	guidelines	that	govern	the	circumstances	under	
13
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which	militaries	and	aid	agencies	coordinate	their	activities	and	it	points	to	the	importance	for	
education	and	training	so	that	both	sets	of	actors	are	prepared	to	engage	in	the	field.			
	
Increasingly,	foreign	militaries	are	called	to	respond	to	major	disasters.	In	these	cases,	
foreign	militaries	will	provide	assistance	both	in	line	with	bi-lateral	agreements	between	states	
and	in	conjunction	with	the	international	humanitarian	system,	coordinated	by	the	United	
Nations	Resident	Coordinator,	supported	by	the	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	
Affairs	(UNOCHA).	The	rules	governing	the	use	of	foreign	military	assets	for	international	
disaster	response	are	known	as	the	Oslo	Guidelines	(formally	the	Guidelines	on	The	Use	of	
Foreign	Military	and	Civil	Defence	Assets	in	Disaster	Relief).	These	guidelines	stipulate	whether,	
when,	how	and	under	what	circumstances	foreign	military	assets	may	be	used	in	the	provision	
of	disaster	relief	and	govern	how	foreign	militaries	engage	with	international	humanitarian	
agencies.	
	
A	series	of	humanitarian	reforms	that	started	with	United	Nations	General	Assembly	
46/1911,	led	to	changes	to	the	structure	of	the	international	humanitarian	system	and	how	its	
constituent	parts	are	organized	and	coordinated.	The	intent	of	these	reforms	is	to	improve	the	
effectiveness	and	efficiency	of	aid	delivery,	to	improve	coordination	among	humanitarian	
agencies,	and	to	make	the	agents	of	aid	responsible	and	accountable	to	its	recipients.	Two	
correlates	of	these	reforms	were	essential	to	ensuring	that	the	reforms	had	teeth,	namely:	
professionalization	of	the	field,	and	the	increased	adoption	of	evidence-based	approaches	to	
aid	delivery.	
	
Expanding	the	evidence	base	
Despite	years	of	reforms	that	have	made	evidence-based	programming	with	monitoring	
and	evaluation	integral	to	the	practice,	this	has	rarely	been	applied	to	evaluating	humanitarian	
civil-military	engagement.	There	is	little	evidence	available	to	answer	even	the	most	basic	
questions.	What	are	the	factors	associated	with	effective	civil-military	coordination?	What	are	
the	reputational	costs/benefits	of	humanitarian	agencies	coordinating	with	foreign	militaries?	
How	do	recipients	of	aid	perceive	foreign	militaries	and	humanitarian	agencies’	roles	in	aid	
delivery?	Does	the	use	of	foreign	militaries	to	deliver	aid	lead	to	dependence	on	militaries	for	
this	kind	of	service?	Does	humanitarian	civil-military	engagement	save	more	lives	than	would	
have	been	saved	absent	this	engagement?	
	
David	Polatty,	a	professor	at	the	U.S.	Naval	War	College’s	Humanitarian	Response	
Program,	which	works	closely	with	UNOCHA	and	the	Harvard	Humanitarian	Initiative,	recently	
noted	that	“Militaries	typically	do	a	very	thorough	job	analyzing	their	responses	to	natural	
disasters	and	publishing	detailed	lessons	observed.		Most	humanitarian	organizations	do	the	
same.	What	we	haven’t	seen	often	enough,	though,	is	a	cross-functional	approach	where	
academics,	humanitarians,	and	militaries	come	together	to	make	an	effort	to	comprehensively	
                                                
1	https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r191.htm			
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examine	civil-military	engagement	and	attempt	to	measure	its	effectiveness	with	respect	to	
positive	and	negative	impacts	on	the	affected	state	and	its	population.”	
	
Developing	an	empirical	evidence	based	on	how	international	militaries	and	
humanitarian	agencies	perform	in	the	delivery	of	aid	and	the	impact	of	their	engagement	with	
each	other	is	essential	for	informing	the	development	of	policy,	as	well	as	improving	training	
and	ultimately,	reducing	frictions	and	increasing	effectiveness	in	emergency	response	when	it	is	
needed	most.	There	is	good	movement	in	this	direction	with	trainings	being	offered	routinely	
by	UN	OCHA	as	well	as	the	United	States	Agency	for	International	Development’s	Office	for	
Foreign	Disaster	Assistance	(OFDA),	and	the	Center	for	Excellence	in	Disaster	Management	and	
Humanitarian	Assistance	(CFEDMHA).	But	humanitarian	civil	military	training	should	be	
expanded	through	greater	partnerships,	especially	with	academic	institutions,	where	
professionals	can	be	trained	not	only	on	the	guidelines	and	practice	of	humanitarian	civil	
military	engagement	but	on	the	critical	methods	required	to	evaluate	its	outcome.		
	
	
	
This	paper	originally	appeared	on	the	Advanced	Training	Program	on	Humanitarian	Action	
(ATHA)	blog,	a	program	of	the	Harvard	Humanitarian	Initiative.		
 
	
15
Civilian-Military	Humanitarian	Response	Workshop	Paper 
 
 
The	views	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	author	and	do	not	reflect	the	official	policy	or	position	of	the	Department	of	the	Navy,	
Department	of	Defense,	or	the	U.S.	Government.	 
 
Improving Civil-Military Coordination and 
Protecting Aid Workers 
__________________________________________ 
 
Julia Brooks, MALD 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 
 
A	number	of	important	developments	and	trends	are	forcing	us	to	rethink	humanitarian	
response	in	general,	and	civil-military	engagement	in	particular.	These	include:	the	increased	
frequency	and	impact	of	natural	disasters	and	complex	emergencies,	exacerbated	by	the	effects	
of	climate	change;	rapid	urbanization	and	population	growth,	and	with	it,	urban	poverty,	
violence	and	instability;1	and	the	increased	involvement	of	international	militaries	in	responding	
to	these	crises,	alongside	humanitarian	actors.	
	
To	this	list	of	trends,	I’d	like	to	add	several	more	concerning	ones:	First,	while	large-scale	
killing	in	violent	conflicts	is	decreasing,	volatility	and	low-intensity	conflicts	are	increasing.2	
Second,	forced	displacement	is	at	record	levels,	with	over	60	million	people	currently	displaced	
around	the	globe,	the	majority	of	whom,	38	million,	are	not	refugees	but	rather	internally	
displaced.3	If	the	population	of	forcibly	displaced	were	a	country,	it	would	reportedly	be	the	
world’s	24th	largest.4	Displacement	is	also	contributing	to	urbanization	in	two	ways:	first,	the	
majority	of	the	world’s	refugees	and	displaced	persons	now	end	up	in	cities	and	towns,	not	
refugee	camps;5	and	second,	as	people	remain	longer	in	displacement,	some	of	today’s	largest	
refugee	camps	–	such	as	Dadaab	camp	in	Kenya	or	Zaatari	camp	in	Jordan	–	are	likely	to	
become	tomorrow’s	cities.6	
	
                                                
1	United	Nations	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs,	“OCHA	in	2014	&	2015:	Plan	and	Budget,”	
accessed	March	1,	2016,	http://www.unocha.org/ochain/2014-15/field-activities.	
2	See	Human	Security	Report	Project,	“Human	Security	Report	2013:	The	Decline	in	Global	Violence:	Evidence,	
Explanation,	and	Contestation”	(Vancouver:	Human	Security	Press,	2013),	
http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2013/HSRP_Report_2013_140226_Web.pdf.	
3	“Global	Overview	2015:	People	Internally	Displaced	by	Conflict	and	Violence”	(Internal	Displacement	Monitoring	
Centre,	May	2015),	http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201505-Global-Overview-
2015/20150506-global-overview-2015-en.pdf.	
4	“Forced	Displacement:	A	Growing	Global	Crisis	FAQs,”	World	Bank,	December	16,	2015,	
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/forced-displacement-a-growing-global-crisis-
faqs.	
5	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees,	“Urban	Refugees,”	accessed	March	1,	2016,	
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html.	
6	“Refugee	Camps	Are	the	‘Cities	of	Tomorrow’,	Says	Aid	Expert,”	Dezeen,	November	23,	2015,	
http://www.dezeen.com/2015/11/23/refugee-camps-cities-of-tomorrow-killian-kleinschmidt-interview-
humanitarian-aid-expert/.	
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The	third	trend	is	growing	disrespect	for	international	law	and	humanitarian	norms,	and	
with	it,	a	staggering	increase	–	nearly	four-fold	–	in	the	number	of	violent	attacks	against	
humanitarian	aid	workers	over	the	last	decade.7	In	many	of	the	world’s	conflict	zones	–	
especially	Afghanistan,	Syria,	South	Sudan,	Central	African	Republic	and	Pakistan	–	the	Red	
Cross	or	Blue	Shield,	once	designed	to	distinguish	and	protect	humanitarians	from	attack,	is	
increasingly	becoming	a	bull’s-eye.	The	urban	dynamic	is	also	important	here,	since	
discrimination	in	targeting	becomes	even	more	difficult	in	complex	emergencies	in	big	cities,	
given	the	density	of	population	and	complexity	of	actors.	While	some	of	these	attacks	against	
aid	workers	occur	as	a	result	of	indiscriminate	or	mistaken	targeting,	the	majority	appear	to	be	
deliberate.8		
	
Moreover,	we	know	all	too	well	that	threats	and	attacks	on	humanitarian	aid	workers	
do	not	only	emanate	from	non-state	armed	groups.	Following	the	US	airstrike	on	Médecins	San	
Frontières	(MSF)	trauma	center	in	Kunduz,	Afghanistan	on	October	3rd	of	last	year,	for	example,	
separate	MSF	facilities	were	hit	by	Saudi-led	coalition	airstrikes	in	Yemen	on	October	26th	and	
December	2rd,	and	by	airstrikes	in	Syria	on	November	21st	and	28th.9	And	MSF	is	by	no	means	
the	only	organization	to	suffer	from	the	recent	incidents	of	violence	against	aid	workers	and	
facilities.	As	a	result,	some	aid	organizations	now	consider	conventional	armed	forces	to	pose	a	
greater	threat	to	the	security	of	their	staff	than	insurgent	groups	in	certain	environments.		
	
And	while	devastating	in	their	own	right,	attacks	against	aid	workers	have	had	even	
more	devastating	consequences	for	the	populations	they	serve,	curtailing	access	and	depriving	
vulnerable	populations	of	life-saving	assistance.	The	result	is	a	critical	challenge	for	civil-military	
coordination	and	the	humanitarian	sector:	How	to	provide	the	best	assistance	possible	to	
populations	in	need,	marshaling	all	the	resources	at	our	disposal	–	both	humanitarian	and	
military	–	to	respond	to	crises?	How	to	create	a	“new	model	of	civil-military	humanitarian	
coordination”,	as	many	have	appropriately	called	for,	without	jeopardizing	the	essential	
neutral,	impartial,	independent,	and	ultimately,	humanitarian	nature	of	emergency	response,	
and	with	it,	secure	access	for	aid	workers?	
	
Many	have	already	called	for	increased	education	and	training,	and	these	are	critical.	
Military	and	humanitarian	communities	must	get	to	know	each	other	better,	and	participation	
in	joint	trainings	and	simulations	is	a	great	start.	There	is	also	a	need	for	better	means	of	
communication	and	information	sharing	to	ensure	that	this	dialogue	continues	during	
                                                
7	“Aid	Worker	Security	Report	2015:	Figures	at	a	Glance”	(Humanitarian	Outcomes),	accessed	January	11,	2016,	
https://aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/HO_AidWorkerSecPreview_1015_G.PDF;	for	full	dataset,	see	
“The	Aid	Worker	Security	Database	(AWSD),”	Humanitarian	Outcomes,	accessed	January	10,	2016,	
https://aidworkersecurity.org/.	
8	Abby	Stoddard,	Adele	Harmer,	and	Kathleen	Ryou,	“Aid	Worker	Security	Report	2014	-	Unsafe	Passage:	Road	
Attacks	and	Their	Impact	on	Humanitarian	Operations”	(Humanitarian	Outcomes,	August	2014),	
https://aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/Aid%20Worker%20Security%20Report%202014.pdf.	
9	See	Julia	Brooks,	“Amidst	Kunduz	and	a	Year	of	Violence,	Protecting	Humanitarian	Staff,”	Advanced	Training	
Program	on	Humanitarian	Action,	December	22,	2015,	http://www.atha.se/blog/amidst-kunduz-and-year-
violence-protecting-humanitarian-staff.	
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operations,	when	it	is	needed	most.10	And	more	research	is	clearly	needed	to	inform	policy-	
making,	as	much	of	it	remains	anecdotal	or	experiential	today.		
	
But	militaries	must	also	know	when	not	to	engage	in	humanitarian	response.	This	also	
requires	research,	training	and	informed	policy-making.	We	need	to	be	wary	of	the	
militarization	of	humanitarian	aid,	as	much	as	the	humanitarianization	of	military	operations.	
We	need	to	recognize	when	the	needs	of	vulnerable	populations	and	affected	communities	are	
best	served	by	civil-military	cooperation,	such	as	in	certain	large-scale	natural	disasters,	and	
when	they	are	best	served	by	a	clear	separation	between	military	and	humanitarian	action,	
such	as	in	many	conflicts	and	complex	emergencies.	This	is	important	not	just	in	terms	of	joint	
operations,	where	militaries	engage	alongside	humanitarian	actors.	We	must	also	question	
situations	where	militaries	provide	aid	on	their	own,	especially	in	the	course	of	
counterinsurgency	or	“hearts	and	minds”	campaigns.	Humanitarian	agencies	have	frequently	
cited	such	operations	as	contributing	to	perceptions	of	them	as	legitimate	targets	of	attack	in	
countries	like	Afghanistan,	now	among	the	deadliest	for	aid	workers.11	
	
Improving	civil-military	coordination	calls	for	us	to	work	better	together,	and	there	are	
many	circumstances	in	which	that	can	make	a	real	difference.	Yet	especially	in	conflicts	and	
complex	emergencies,	protecting	aid	workers	also	calls	for	us	to	learn	to	work	better	apart.	In	
some	cases,	this	is	because	military	involvement	in	humanitarian	operations	may	pose	an	
inherent	risk	to	aid	workers	and	beneficiary	populations,	especially	when	militaries	are	also	
belligerents	in	a	conflict.	In	other	cases,	this	is	because	experience	demonstrates	that	both	
parties	have	not	yet	learned	to	work	together	effectively,	and	disregard	for	the	implications	of	
their	actions	are	putting	aid	worker	and	civilian	lives	at	risk.		
                                                
10	David	Polatty,	“Overcoming	Hurdles	to	Information	Sharing	and	Technological	Coordination	in	Civil-Military	
Engagement,”	Advanced	Training	Program	on	Humanitarian	Action,	April	6,	2015,	
http://www.atha.se/blog/overcoming-hurdles-information-sharing-and-technological-coordination-civil-military-
engagement.	
11	Alex	Whiting,	“Attacks	on	Aid	Workers	Worldwide	Hit	Worst	Levels	on	Record,”	Reuters,	August	19,	2014,	
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-foundation-aid-attacks-idUSKBN0GJ07S20140819.	
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The Evolution of the Strategic Importance of 
Humanitarian Response 
__________________________________________ 
 
Andrea H. Cameron, CDR, EdD, MA1 
US Naval War College 
 
In	less	than	a	century,	the	notion	of	humanitarian	assistance	evolved	from	a	global	rarity	
to	a	significant	component	of	international	relations.	The	symbiotic	rise	of	humanitarianism	and	
foreign	aid	since	World	War	II	fundamentally	altered	the	international	system	where	achieving	
strategic	objectives	could	be	done	by	other	means	than	force.	The	convergence	of	international	
responsibility	to	the	world	order,	significant	economic	interests,	and	the	global	humanitarian	
values	provides	strategic	motivations	for	continued	U.S.	involvement	in	humanitarian	
assistance/disaster	relief	(HA/DR)	operations.	The	Department	of	State	and	U.S.	Agency	for	
International	Development	(USAID)	lead	these	humanitarian	efforts	from	development	through	
relief.	However,	the	military	can	bring	significant	capability	to	a	humanitarian	crisis	beyond	the	
host	nation	and	international	community’s	capacity.	While	all	services	can	and	do	play	a	role	in	
HA/DR,	the	Navy	and	Marine	Corps	are	uniquely	positioned	for	this	mission.	Largely	self-
sustainable,	forward	deployed,	flexible,	and	trained	for	mobilization	of	sea-to-shore	assets,	the	
maritime	services	can	provide	assistance	fast,	on	location,	and	without	exacerbating	the	ashore	
capacity	constraints.	Additionally,	strategic	lift,	medical	support,	construction	battalions,	air	
traffic	controllers,	and	maritime	pre-positioning	ships	all	contribute	to	HA/DR.	From	1970	to	
2000,	the	U.S.	military	was	diverted	from	its	regular	schedule	to	conduct	HA/DR	operations	366	
times.2	Military	involvement	has	escalated	so	much	so,	particularly	after	the	2004	Indian	Ocean	
Earthquake	and	Tsunami,	that	a	brief	mention	in	early	strategy	documents	has	evolved	into	
entire	sections	and	mission	areas	dedicated	to	the	subject.	This	paper	captures	why	HA/DR	rose	
to	such	a	high	place	in	national	and	military	strategy	and	why	the	military	will	most	likely	
increase	involvement	in	HA/DR	missions	in	the	future.		
	
With	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	the	1990s	saw	the	rise	of	naval	presence	as	a	mission	set	
in	and	of	itself.	The	Navy	and	Marine	Corps	evolved	as	the	key	crisis	responder	in	a	variety	of	
military-operations-other-than-war.	Planning	and	conducting	HA/DR	was	included	in	this	
broader	category,	but	typically	only	given	a	sentence	or	two	of	recognition	in	national	strategy	
documents.3	HA/DR	also	provided	an	opportunity	to	work	military-to-military	relationships	with	
joint	and	coalition	partners	to	improve	operational	cohesion	and	mutual	trust.	While	HA/DR	
                                                
1	Commander	Andrea	H.	Cameron	is	a	Permanent	Military	Professor	in	the	National	Security	Affairs	Department	
teaching	policy	analysis	and	a	member	of	the	NWC	Civilian-Military	Humanitarian	Response	Program	(HRP).	
2	W.	Eugene	Cobble,	H.H.	Gaffney,	Dmitry	Gorenberg.	For	the	Record:	All	U.S.	Forces’	Responses	to	Situations,	
1970-2000	(Alexandria:	Center	for	Naval	Analyses	Corporation,	2005).	
3	Naval	Warfare	(Naval	Doctrine	Publication	1)	reprinted	in	U.S.	Naval	Strategy	in	the	1990s,	ed.	John	B.	Hattendorf	
(Newport:	Naval	War	College	Press,	2006)	p	115-116.	
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was	by	no	means	predominant,	it	was	routinely	mentioned	in	naval	guidance	as	one	of	the	
operational	capabilities	of	the	services.		
	
The	events	of	the	2004	Indian	Ocean	earthquake	and	tsunami	significantly	altered	the	
role	of	humanitarian	assistance/disaster	relief	in	U.S.	strategy.		On	December	26,	2004,	a	9.15	
magnitude	earthquake	occurred	off	the	western	coast	of	Indonesia	in	the	Indian	Ocean.	In	
total,	there	were	over	225,000	reported	dead	or	missing	and	nearly	1.2	million	displaced	
people.4	While	the	State	Department	and	USAID	led	foreign	disaster	relief,	Pacific	Command	
(PACOM)	immediately	supported	them	by	authorizing	ship	movements	toward	the	region.5	
Soon	thereafter,	PACOM	established	Operation	Unified	Assistance.6	By	December	28,	before	
President	George	W.	Bush	publically	announced	the	first	proclamations	of	U.S.	support,	PACOM	
already	established	Joint	Task	Force	536	and	appointed	Lieutenant	General	Robert	Blackman	
from	3rd	Marine	Expeditionary	Force	to	lead	the	efforts.	On	January	3,	the	JTF	evolved	to	
Combined	Support	Force	536	to	include	and	coordinate	the	assets	brought	forth	from	other	
states.	By	January	5,	a	week	and	a	half	after	the	event,	the	United	States	had	25	ships,	45	fixed-
wing	aircraft,	and	58	helicopters	and	a	total	of	over	thirteen	thousand	military	personnel	
supporting	the	HA/DR	mission.7		
	
President	George	W.	Bush	made	the	first	public	commitment	of	support	three	days	after	
the	earthquake	and	tsunami.8	Even	with	the	massive	mobilization	to	support	relief	efforts	by	
state,	USAID,	and	defense	department	to	assist	the	overwhelmed	host	nations,	United	Nations,	
and	governmental	and	non-governmental	organizations,	the	perception	of	delayed	global	
leadership	put	President	Bush	on	the	defensive.	The	United	Nations	Emergency	Relief	
Coordinator,	Jan	Egeland,	openly	accused	the	United	States	of	being	stingy	with	respect	to	the	
global	crisis.9	The	political	handling	of	the	situation	signaled	strategic	weakness	in	global	
leadership,	holes	in	the	security	umbrella,	diminished	willingness	to	come	to	the	assistance	of	
allies,	gaps	in	forward	presence	supporting	the	economic	system,	a	compromise	of	U.S.	values,	
and	general	lack	of	respect	for	human	life	abroad.	A	significant	lesson	learned	by	the	United	
States	was	to	better	manage	the	politics	and	public	diplomacy.		Ultimately,	the	United	States	
government	donated	$950M	and	American	citizens	donated	$700M	to	charities,	but	the	
appearance	of	diminished	global	leadership	permanently	altered	the	U.S.	perception	of	the	
strategic	importance	of	the	proper	handling	of	humanitarian	missions.10	
	
                                                
4	Office	of	U.S.	Foreign	Disaster	Assistance	(OFDA)	Annual	Report	for	Fiscal	Year	2005.	(Washington,	D.C.,	U.S.	
Agency	for	International	Development,	2005),	15.	Retrieved	from	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH800.pdf	on	
18	October	2014.	
5	Elleman,	Waves	of	Hope,	p	28.	
6	Elleman,	Waves	of	Hope,	p	28.	
7	Wall	of	Water:	U.S.	Troops	Aid	Tsunami	Victims.	Department	of	Defense	Year	in	Review	2005.		Retrieved	from	
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2006/2005yearinreview/article2.html	on	December	17,	2014.	
8	Bruce	A.	Elleman,	Waves	of	Hope:	The	U.S.	Navy’s	Response	to	the	Tsunami	in	Northern	Indonesia	(Newport:	
Naval	War	College	Press,	2007),	p	22.	
9	Elleman,	Waves	of	Hope,	p	21.	
10	Elleman,	Waves	of	Hope,	p	101.		
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After	this	event,	humanitarian	assistance/disaster	relief	emerged	as	a	noteworthy	
component	of	U.S.	national	strategy.	President	George	W.	Bush’s	2006	National	Security	
Strategy	shifted	humanitarian	assistance	from	the	occasional	recognition	that	the	mission-set	
existed	to	a	stand-alone	section	at	the	end	of	the	document	addressing	international	
engagement,	globalization,	and	environmental	destruction.11	The	2006	Quadrennial	Defense	
Review	also	expanded	on	several	humanitarian	assistance	related	items.12	But	it	was	the	2007	
Cooperative	Strategy	for	21st	Century	Seapower,	signed	by	the	service	chiefs	of	the	Navy,	
Marine	Corps,	and	Coast	Guard,	that	fully	elevated	HA/DR	to	one	of	the	six	core	capabilities	of	
the	sea	services.		
	
In	2010,	President	Barack	Obama’s	National	Security	Strategy	broadly	addressed	both	
climate	change	and	humanitarian	assistance.	Not	only	did	this	reflect	the	change	in	leadership,	
but	also	the	devastating	effect	of	the	2010	Haiti	earthquake	that	resulted	in	over	222,000	
fatalities.	Follow-on	strategy	documents	continue	to	reiterate	the	humanitarian	assistance	
mission	in	a	wide	variety	of	contexts.	The	2010	Quadrennial	Defense	Review	connected	HA/DR	
with	climate	change	and	energy	security	as	well	as	regional	destabilization	as	a	result	of	climate	
change.	The	2011	National	Military	Strategy	addressed	HA/DR	in	strengthening	international	
and	regional	security—focusing	on	the	joint,	interagency,	and	theater	security	cooperation	
aspects	before,	during,	and	after	an	event.13	The	2012	Defense	Strategic	Guidance	includes	
HA/DR	domestically	in	support	of	civil	authorities	and	internationally	to	provide	military	
response	options	to	major	events.14	Within	the	2014	Quadrennial	Defense	Review,	HA/DR	had	
interestingly	shifted	to	be	part	of	the	power	projection	capability	of	the	military.15	In	President	
Obama’s	2015	National	Security	Strategy,	HA/DR	is	further	mentioned	in	the	context	of	building	
our	national	defense,	building	partner	capacity,	and	confronting	climate	change.16	Finally,	the	
2015	Cooperative	Strategy	for	21st	Century	Seapower	continues	to	include	providing	HA/DR	as	
a	core	naval	function.17	While	the	continued	justifications	for	military	involvement	in	HA/DR	
vary	greatly,	the	increasing	emphasis	on	this	subset	of	the	mission	has	undeniably	grown.		
	
Understanding	the	early	military	contributions	to	humanitarian	assistance,	studying	
what	happened	in	2004,	and	examining	the	various	strategic	guidance	afterward	reflects	the	
monumental	strategic	shift	of	using	hard	power	assets	for	this	soft	power	mission.	As	learned	
after	2004,	if	the	United	States	is	going	to	protect	strategic,	political,	economic,	and	ideological	
interests	abroad,	then	we	must	employ	all	instruments	of	national	power	including	the	military	
                                                
11	National	Security	Strategy	2006,	signed	by	President	George	W.	Bush,	p	47-48		
12	Quadrennial	Defense	Review	2006,	signed	by	Secretary	of	Defense	Donald	H.	Rumsfeld,	p	12-13.		
http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf	
13	National	Military	Strategy	2011,	signed	by	the	Chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Admiral	Michael	G.	Mullen,	p	
15.	
14	Defense	Strategic	Guidance	2012,	signed	by	President	Barack	Obama,	p	6.		
15	Quadrennial	Defense	Review	2014,	signed	by	Secretary	of	Defense	Chuck	Hagel,	p	60-61.	
16	National	Security	Strategy	2015,	signed	by	President	Barack	Obama,	p	7.	
17	Cooperative	Strategy	for	21st	Century	Seapower-2015,	signed	by	Commandant	of	the	Marine	Corps,	General	
Joseph	F.	Dunford,	Jr.,	Chief	of	Naval	Operations	Admiral	Jonathan	W.	Greenert,	and	Commandant	of	the	Coast	
Guard,	Admiral	Paul	F.	Zukunft,	p	19.	
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to	support	HA/DR	missions.	The	number	of	large	scale	natural	disasters	continues	to	escalate	
since	the	2004	earthquake/tsunami	and	climate	change	scientists	predict	increased	incidences	
and	severity	of	natural	disasters.	Whether	disasters	are	labeled	environmental	destruction	or	
climate	change—the	evidence	shows	that	HA/DR	will	remain	a	mission	for	the	armed	services	
no	matter	who	is	leading	the	country.	Whatever	the	justification	for	doing	HA/DR	operations,	it	
will	continue	to	support	U.S.	interests	and	the	strategic	consequences	of	getting	it	wrong	are	
too	great.		Within	this	context,	NWC	looks	forward	to	improving	humanitarian	response.	
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Theater Security Cooperation and Global Health 
Engagement: Measuring Success at Different 
Levels of Analysis 
__________________________________________ 
 
Glen Diehl, CAPT, PhD, USN 
Solomon Major, PhD 
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Center for Global Health Engagement 
 
Understanding	the	effect	of	US	Department	of	Defense’s	(DoD’s)	security	cooperation	
(SC)	activities	around	the	world	has	never	been	as	important	as	it	is	today.		When	considering	
the	rebalance	to	the	India-Asia-Pacific	area	and	the	need	for	continued	engagement	in	many	
strategic	areas	of	interest	to	the	US	government,	the	use	of	SC	offers	military	personnel	an	
important	way	to	engage	prospective	partners	under	the	aegis	of	collegiality	and	collaboration.		
Determining	the	impact	and	effect	of	SC	engagements	remains	a	challenging	proposition	
however.		How	can	this	be	done	in	a	cogent	manner	that	maintains	relevance	to	military	
personnel,	the	inter-agency,	our	Partner	Nations	(PNs)	and,	of	course,	good	stewardship	of	
taxpayer’s	money?		Understanding	the	ongoing	efforts	and	matching	their	planning	and	
execution	to	the	strategic,	operation	and	tactical	levels	of	analysis	is	a	good	place	to	start.			
	
Impact	assessment	of	activities	in	the	field	has	recently	seen	a	great	increase	in	the	
quantity	and	quality	of	its	tools	and	products,	with	organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	
India-based	International	Initiative	for	Impact	Evaluation	(3ie)	organization	often	leading	the	
way.		The	US	Government	(USG)	has	not	been	isolated	from	these	developments	and	many	
organizations	in	the	Interagency,	such	as	the	US	Agency	for	International	Development	(USAID)	
and	the	State	Department,	have	likewise	begun	to	integrate	assessment,	monitoring	and	
evaluation	(AME)	into	their	projects	and	programs.		Spurred	by	the	2013	“Global	Health	Policy	
Cable”	from	Office	of	the	Undersecretary	of	Defense	for	Policy,	which	mandated	that	future	
global	health	engagement	(GHE)	activities	must	have	an	AME	component,	and	National	Defense	
Authorization	Act	(NDAA)	2013	Section	715,	which	specified	that	health	engagements	must	be	
“effective	and	efficient	in	meeting	the	national	security	goals	of	the	United	States,”1	the	DoD	
has	followed	suit	and	has	increasingly	sought	the	means	to	determine	the	policy	efficacy	of	its	
activities,	particularly	in	the	domains	of	SC	and	GHE.	
	
In	order	to	catch	up	to	the	level	of	maturity	of	the	assessment	efforts	undertaken	by	
other	USG	agencies	and	international	organizations,	while	maintaining	relevance	to	military	
personnel,	SC	and	GHE	assessment	must	address	a	number	of	definitional	and	conceptual	
                                                
1	Assistant	Secretary	of	Defense,	Health	Affairs,	2013.	Global	Health	Policy	(Cable).	Washington,	DC:	The	
Department	of	Defense.	
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issues.		For	example,	even	the	newly	coined	term,	“AME,”	risks	conflating	two	very	different	
evaluative	practices:	(impact)	assessment	and	monitoring	and	evaluation	(M&E).		While	the	two	
are	clearly	closely	related,	M&E	is	limited	to	defining	desirable	end-states	and	determining	
whether	the	US	or	the	PN	has	realized	or	is	advancing	towards	them.		On	the	other	hand,	
impact	assessment	not	only	measures	progress	towards	goals,	but	also	determines	the	degree	
to	which	particular	US	projects	and	programs	contribute	towards	their	realization;	because	
impact	assessment	measures	activities’	effectiveness,	it	can	be	used	to	calculate	DoD’s	return	
on	investment	(ROI)	for	its	SC	and	GHE	activities	as	well.		These	differences	suggest	that	A-and-
M&E	not	only	have	distinct	goals,	but	also	that	the	analytic	methods	appropriate	to	one	may	
not	be	equally	well-suited	the	other.2		Likewise,	selection	from	among	the	research	methods	
available	for	SC	and	GHE	evaluation	is	a	similarly	fruitful	area	for	future	exploration.		Case	
studies	and	process-tracing,	quantitative	methods	and	experimental	methods	each	offer	
significant	advantages	to	analysts—but	each	also	suffers	from	certain	problems	as	well.		
Military	personnel	conducting	assessments	or	M&E	activities	should	be	aware	of	both	the	
benefits	and	pitfalls	of	the	methods	available	and	should	ensure	that	the	chosen	methods	are	
appropriate	to	the	problems	with	which	they	have	been	tasked.3			
	
Military	personnel	further	need	to	consider	another	foundational	issue	concerning	the	
effective	execution	of	military	AME—the	appropriate	levels	and	units	of	analysis.		Consistent	
with	existing	Joint	Force	doctrine,	this	paper	argues	that	there	are	three	principal	levels	at	
which	military	assessments	may	take	place:	the	Strategic,	the	Operational	and	the	Tactical	
levels	of	analysis,	respectively.			It	further	suggests	that	the	level	of	analysis	should	be	
intimately	related	with	the	unit	of	analysis	and	notes	that	many	of	the	problems	currently	
observed	in	SC	and	GHE	assessment	come	from	mismatches	between	levels	and	units	of	
analysis,	such	as	when	strategic	goals	are	matched	with	tactical	units	of	analysis.		Not	
surprisingly,	disagreements	between	the	level	of	assessment	and	the	level	at	which	the	data	are	
collected	gives	rise	to	confused	and	ambiguous	assessment	products.		
	
The	AME	literature	and	assessment	experience	in	the	field	has	repeatedly	shown	that	
matching	the	level	of	analysis	with	the	level	of	the	activity	whose	efficacy	was	to	be	gauged	
serves	as	a	critical	first	step	in	getting	subsequent	analyses	“right.”		The	correct	choice	of	level	
of	analysis	infers	that	one	must	also	make	a	parallel	choice	in	units	of	analysis:	strategic	and	
operational	programs	can	generally	be	assessed	by	observing	PN	activities	and	their	progress	
towards	desired	end-states,	whereas	tactical	engagements	should	focus	their	AM&E	efforts	at	
the	sub-national	level.			
	
Although	there	is	oftentimes	a	desire	to	directly	connect	“success”	in	Tactical	level	
engagements	to	Operational	or	Strategic	level	outcomes,	we	argue	that	linking	these	together	
                                                
2	Glendon	Diehl	and	Solomon	Major,	“MOE	vs.	M&E:	Considering	the	Difference	Between	Measuring	Strategic	
Effectiveness	and	Monitoring	Tactical	Evaluation,”	Military	Medicine	180	(2015),	77-82,	accessed	October	22,	2015,	
http://publications.amsus.org/doi/abs/10.7205/MILMED-D-14-00171.	
3	Shahidur	R.	Khandker,	Handbook	on	Impact	Evaluation:	Quantitative	Methods	and	Practices	(Washington,	DC:	
World	Bank	Publications,	2009). 
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is	fraught	with	methodological	challenges.		While	tactical	engagements	do	impact	the	larger,	
strategic	picture,	observing	this	impact	means	first	aggregating	and	rolling	up	these	efforts	to	
the	program	and	country	levels.		Without	doing	this,	one	risks	the	potential	of	mistakenly	
generalizing	a	local	success	to	an	entire	province,	region	or	nation.		The	DoD	should	develop	a	
holistic	approach	to	AME,	similar	to	Admiral	(Retired)	Stavridis’	call	for	a	holistic	approach	to	
national	and	regional	security.4		AME	offers	the	DoD	the	opportunity	to	be	at	its	best	in	
understanding	the	impact	of	its	activities,	its	ROI	for	SC,	and	the	value	proposition	for	our	
partners,	allies,	and	across	the	USG.			
 
                                                
4	James	G.	Stavridis,	Partnership	for	the	Americas:	Western	Hemisphere	Strategy	and	the	US	Sothern	Command	
(Washington,	DC:	National	Defense	University	Press,	2010),	26.	
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Using Women to Create a More Stable Society 
through Animal Production and Health 
__________________________________________ 
 
Melissa R. Finley, DVM, PhD, DACVIM 
Sandia National Laboratories  
 
The	2011	United	States	National	Action	Plan	for	Women,	Peace,	and	Security	advocates	
that	women	must	be	empowered	as	equal	stakeholders	in	preventing	conflict	and	building	
peace	in	countries	threatened	and	affected	by	war,	violence,	and	instability.		The	plan	provides	
five	key	objectives:	1)	national	integration	and	institutionalization;	2)	participation	in	the	peace	
process	and	decision-making;	3)	protection	from	violence;	4)	conflict	prevention;	5)	and	access	
to	relief	and	recovery.1		Women’s	roles	and	responsibilities	in	building	stable	societies	and	
participating	in	these	key	objectives	vary	across	the	globe.		Conflict,	insecurity,	and	political	
violence	are	most	prevalent	in	Africa,	the	Middle	East,	South	and	Central	Asia	as	demonstrated	
by	the	Global	Economy	Index	measuring	political	stability,2	where	women	are	often	not	
afforded	the	same	opportunities	as	their	counterparts	in	more	developed	parts	of	the	world.			
The	integration	of	women	into	these	processes	is	often	complex,	and	largely	based	on	culture	
and	tradition.	Therefore,	it	is	essential	to	identify	areas	where	women	can	make	significant	
strides	in	roles	that	are	already	recognized.		Livestock	are	often	considered	a	venue	for	
encouraging	gender	balance	in	developing	countries,	because	women	are	recognized	as	
livestock	keeper.3	4	5	Thus	women	have	established	competency	in	the	field	of	livestock	
production,	and	have	the	inherent	capacity	to	succeed	to	help	build	more	stable	communities.	
Engaging	women,	and	farmers	in	general,	in	the	area	of	livestock	disease	control	and	
prevention	can	improve	animal	production	and	sustain	livelihoods	and	the	food	supply.	
	
The	Value	of	Livestock	
Economic	growth	and	poverty	alleviation	generated	by	agricultural	productivity	has	
been	well	documented.6	7	8	Agriculture	is	consistently	the	largest	source	of	livelihoods	for	rural	
                                                
1	House	T.W.	(2011).	–	United	States	National	Action	Plan	on	Women,	Peace,	and	Security.	In,	The	White	House,	
Washington	DC.	
2	Economy.Com	T.G.	(2014).	–	Political	Stability	Index	In,	Ed:	T.G.	Economy.Com,	The	Global	Economy.Com.	
3	Gueye	E.F.	(2005).	–	Gender	Aspects	in	Family	Poutry	Management	Systems	in	Developing	Countries.	World's	
Poultry	Science	Journal,	61	(1),	39-46. 
4	Anon.	(1994).	–	Women	Livestock	Managers	in	the	Third	World:	A	Focus	on	Technical	Issues.	In,	IFAD,	Rome.	
5	FAO	(2012).	–	Livestock	Sector	Development	for	Poverty	Reduction:	An	Economic	and	Policy	Perspective	-	
Livestock's	Many	Virtues.	In,	FAO,	Rome.	
6	Gallup	J.,	Radelt	S.	&	Warner	A.	(1997).	–	Economic	Growth	and	the	Income	of	the	Poor:	CAER	II	Discussion	Paper	
36.	In,	Institute	for	International	Development,	Washington	DC.	
 
7	Datt	G.	&	Ravallion	M.	(1998).	–	Farm	Productivity	in	Rural	Poverty	in	India.	In,	International	Food	Policy	Research	
Institute	Washington	DC.	
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households	in	the	developing	world,	and	agricultural	productivity	reduces	poverty	better	than	
growth	in	other	sectors.	Recent	studies	show	that	livestock	production	can	promote	even	
broader	economic	growth.7	8	9	Moreover,	governments	and	international	donor	organizations	
are	beginning	to	recognize	that	agriculture	and	livestock	are	the	foundation	of	livelihoods,	
economic	growth,	and	food	security.10	This	is	especially	true	in	regions	of	the	world	where	a	
significant	portion	of	the	population	relies	on	agriculture	and	livestock	production	for	food	and	
resources.				
	
Livestock	make	important	contributions	to	sustainable	rural	development	through	
securing	assets	of	the	poor,	improving	small	farm	and	pastoral	productivity,	and	increase	the	
market	participation	of	the	poor.11		This	is	especially	relevant,	given	the	demand	for	animal-
source	food	(ASF)	and	animal	products	is	growing	rapidly.12	Livestock	contribute	to	
approximately	40	percent	of	the	global	value	of	agricultural	output	and	livelihoods	and	food	
security	for	nearly	a	billion	people.13		Moreover,	livestock	are	critical	assets	that	store	wealth,	
are	collateral	for	credit,	and	reduce	the	vulnerability	of	families	during	crises.13		Agriculture	is	
consistently	the	largest	source	of	income	and	livelihoods	for	rural	households	in	the	developing	
world,	providing	more	than	50	percent	of	household	revenue.12	14			
	
The	Role	of	Women	in	Livestock	Production	and	Health		
Women	make	essential	contributions	to	agricultural	sectors	worldwide	through	
livestock	rearing,	production	of	animal	based	products,	and	promotion	of	animal	health.15	
Approximately	752	million	of	the	world’s	poor	have	livestock	for	food,	income,	work,	and/or	
societal	status,	and	women	comprise	two-thirds	of	this	population.5	Women	participate	in	both	
crop	and	livestock	production,	with	43	percent	of	the	agricultural	labor	force	of	developing	
countries	consisting	of	women.12			
	
The	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	for	the	United	Nations	(FAO),	the	World	Bank,	
the	United	States	Agency	for	International	Development,	and	other	international	organizations	
widely	recognize	the	value	of	women	in	agriculture.		However,	comprehensive	assessments	of	
women’s	productivity	in	the	agricultural	and	livestock	sectors	show	that	gender	inequalities	and	
                                                                                                                                                       
8	Irz	X.,	Lin	L.,	Thirtle	C.	&	Winning	S.	(2001).	–	Agricultural	Productivity	Growth	and	Poverty	Alleviation.	
Development	Policy	Review,	19	(4),	449-466.	
9	Pica	G.,	Pica-Ciamarra	U.	&	Otte	J.	(2008).	–	The	Livestock	Sector	in	World	Development:	Re-assessing	the	Policy	
Priorities.	In,	FAO,	Rome.	
10	FAO	(2011).	–	Women	in	Agriculture:	Closing	the	Gender	Gap.	In,	FAO,	Rome.	
11	IRIL	(2007).	–	Markets	that	Work	-	Making	a	Living	from	Livestock.	In,	IRIL.	
12	Otte	J.,	Costales	A.,	Dijkman	J.,	Pica-Ciamarra	U.,	Robinson	V.,	Ahuja	D.	&	Roland-Holst	D.	(2012).	–	Livestock	
sector	development	for	poverty	reduction:	an	economic	and	policy	perspective.	In,	FOOD	AND	AGRICULTURE	
ORGANIZATION	OF	THE	UNITED	NATIONS,	Rome. 
13	FAO	(2009).	–	The	State	of	Food	and	Agriculture:	Livestock	in	the	Balance.	In,	FAO,	Rome.	
14	Jayne	T.S.,	Yaman	T.,	Weber	M.T.,	Tschirley	D.,	Benfica	R.,	Chapoto	A.	&	Zulu	B.	(2002).	–	Smallholder	income	and	
land	distribution	in	Africa:	implications	for	poverty	reduction.	Food	Policy,	253–275.	
15	Okali	C.	(2011).	–	Notes	on	Livestock,	Food	Security,	and	Gender	Equity.	In,	FAO,	Rome.	
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challenges	significantly	reduce	the	productivity	of	women	farmers	globally.16		Their	roles	and	
responsibilities	vary	based	on	region;	however,	it	has	been	well	documented	that	women	tend	
to	work	primarily	with	poultry,	sheep,	goats,	mange	dairy	production,	and	often	help	support	
animal	health.11		17			
	
As	the	primary	caretaker	of	herds,	flocks,	and/or	individual	animals,	women	not	only	
serve	as	producers,	but	also	play	a	significant	role	in	animal	health	and	biosecurity.16	In	the	
developing	world,	approximately	30	percent	of	livestock	production,	in	the	form	of	milk,	meat	
and	eggs,	is	lost	because	of	animal	diseases.18		Engaging	women,	and	farmers	in	general,	in	the	
area	of	livestock	disease	control	and	prevention	can	improve	animal	production	and	sustain	
livelihoods	and	the	food	supply.			Additionally,	women	are	often	called	upon	to	care	for	and	
watch	over	livestock,	and	are	therefore,	skilled	at	identifying	livestock	diseases.		Engaging	
women	on	issues	related	to	animal	diseases	can	help	animal	health	sectors	rapidly	identify	
disease	outbreaks	and	prevent	diseases	transmission.		Doing	such,	could	significantly	increase	
livestock	production	capabilities	and	output.		Women	are	increasingly	entering	into	fields	
associated	with	livestock	production	and	disease	prevention;	however,	they	are	extremely	
underrepresented.		It	is	estimated	that	only	15	percent	of	the	world’s	extension	agents	are	
women.19		Providing	women	with	educational	opportunities	in	husbandry	and	animal	health	
and	facilitating	access	to	extension	and	financial	services	would	improve	their	production	
capabilities,	and	consequently	garner	more	food	and	income,	and	would	likely	foster	stability.17	
20			
	
	
Summary	
Strengthening	women’s	roles	in	livestock	production	and	animal	health	by	providing	
essential	inputs	and	training	to	bridge	the	gender	gap	would	improve	animal	productivity	and	
food	security,	provide	sustainable	livelihoods	and	economic	drivers,	and	improve	overall	animal	
and	public	health.10		FAO	reported	that	if	women	were	afforded	the	same	resources	as	their	
male	counterparts	in	agriculture	(in	general),	they	could	increase	the	yield	on	farms	by	20	–	30	
percent,	which	would	raise	total	agricultural	output	in	developing	countries	by	2.5	–	4	percent;	
this	would	reduce	the	number	of	hungry	people	by	12	–	17	percent.10	Such	gains	would	
enhance	food	security,	economic	development,	and	thereby	improve	community	stability.			
	
                                                
16	Anon.	(2009).	–	Gender	in	Agriculture.	In,	The	World	Bank,	Washington	DC.	
17	FAO	(2013).	–	Understanding	and	Integrationg	Gender	Issues	into	Livestock	Programmes	and	Projects.	In,	FAO,	
Rome.	
18	Upton	M.	(2004).	–	The	Role	of	Livestock	in	Economic	Development	and	Poverty	Reduction	In	Pro-Poor	Livestock	
Policy	Initiative	Working	Paper	10,	FAO.	
19	Department	E.a.S.D.	(2009).	–	Gender	and	Livestock	In	Gender	in	Agriculture	The	World	Bank	Washington	DC. 
20	Ayele	P.	&	Peacock	C.	(2003).	–	Improving	Access	to	and	Consumption	of	Animal	Source	Foods	in	Rural	
Households:	The	Experiences	of	Women-Focused	Development	Program	in	the	Highlands	of	Ethiopia.	Journal	of	
Nutrition,	133	(11),	3981S-3986S.	
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The Employment of Naval Forces in 
Humanitarian Response 
__________________________________________ 
 
Tony Fox, JD 
US Naval War College 
 
On	December	26,	2004,	a	powerful	underwater	earthquake	just	west	of	Sumatra	set	off	
tsunamis	that	swept	across	the	Bay	of	Bengal	and	the	Indian	Ocean.	Thirty-foot	high	waves	
crashed	ashore,	causing	widespread	death	and	destruction	throughout	much	of	southern	Asia	
and	even	reaching	the	shores	of	east	Africa.	This	was	one	of	the	worst	natural	disasters	the	
world	has	ever	seen.	
	
The	island	of	Sumatra,	and	particularly	its	northernmost	region,	Aceh	Province,	was	
worst	hit.		Estimates	are	that	over	120,000	people	died	in	Aceh	Province	alone.		The	interior	of	
Aceh	Province	is	very	mountainous.	Large	sections	of	the	coastal	road	became	impassable,	
leaving	air	and	sealift	as	the	primary	means	of	getting	aid	to	survivors.	Within	days	of	the	
disaster,	the	aircraft	carrier	USS	Abraham	Lincoln	was	ordered	to	sail	with	her	escorts	to	
Sumatra,	arriving	on	January	1,	2005.	A	seven-ship	amphibious	group	was	sent	from	Guam	at	
the	same	time.	
	
By	January	5,	the	US	Navy	had	25	ships,	45	airplanes,	and	58	helicopters	participating	in	
the	Sumatra	relief	effort.		The	Royal	Australian	Navy	sent	an	amphibious	ship,	HMAS	Kanimbla,	
as	well	as	medical	and	engineering	personnel,	cargo	planes,	and	helicopters.		Two	Japanese	
Maritime	Self	Defense	Force	ships	joined	the	relief	effort.	Singapore	also	contributed	an	
amphibious	ship,	while	Germany,	the	United	Kingdom,	and	China	each	sent	medical	teams.	
	
Nearly	nine	years	later,	on	Friday,	November	8,	2013,	the	strongest	storm	on	record	to	
make	landfall	–	Super	Typhoon	Haiyan	-	hit	the	Philippines.	The	storm	generated	sustained	
winds	of	195	miles	per	hour	with	gusts	to	235	mph	and	landfall	waves	of	50	feet,	leading	to	
estimates	that	Haiyan	was	“probably	the	strongest	tropical	cyclone	to	hit	land	anywhere	in	the	
world	in	recorded	history.”1		As	of	early	2014,	the	death	toll	from	Haiyan	was	estimated	to	be	
6,201,	with	an	additional	1,785	people	still	missing.	
	
Fifty-eight	nations	provided	relief	to	the	Philippines	in	the	wake	of	this	disaster,	and	20	
of	those	nations	deployed	military	assets.	The	US	military’s	participation	in	the	Haiyan	relief	
effort	was	spearheaded	by	Joint	Task	Force	(JTF)	505,	a	composite	organization	created	for	this	
specific	mission.	The	USS	George	Washington	carrier	group	and	Marines	of	the	3rd	Marine	
                                                
1	Mullen,	Jethro.	“Super	Typhoon	Haiyan,	one	of	the	strongest	storms	ever,	hits	central	Philippines,”	CNN,	
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/07/world/asia/philippines-typhoon-haiyan/	Nov.	8,	2013.	Accessed	10/17/2016.	
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Expeditionary	Brigade	(many	transported	on	the	U.S.	Navy	amphibious	ships	USS	Ashland	and	
USS	Germantown)	comprised	the	majority	of	the	JTF’s	assets.	The	USS	George	Washington,	
accompanied	by	three	other	US	Navy	ships,	arrived	on	station	in	the	Philippines	on	November	
14.	At	its	peak,	the	JTF	had	66	aircraft	and	twelve	naval	vessels.	JTF	aircraft	reconnoitered	
damaged	islands,	searching	for	survivors	and	contributing	to	damage	estimates	as	well	as	
delivering	relief	supplies	and	aid	workers,	and	evacuating	typhoon	victims	as	needed.		
	
													As	evidenced	by	these	examples,	naval	forces	can	be	effective	responders	to	
humanitarian	crises.	Frequently,	they	are	among	the	first	responders.	Naval	crews	are	trained	
to	operate	in	chaotic,	uncertain	environments,	to	face	significant	risk,	and	to	take	effective	and	
appropriate	action	under	difficult	circumstances.		The	open	seas	can	provide	access	from	many	
directions.	Naval	vessels	are	mobile	and	relatively	quick	-	a	ship	traveling	at	25	knots	covers	600	
nautical	miles	in	24	hours.	Many	naval	vessels	are	multi-purpose	platforms,	flexible	and	
adaptable	by	design,	and	are	able	to	switch	nimbly	from	one	mission	to	another.	Many	ships,	
built	for	lengthy	deployments,	can	carry	enormous	quantities	of	supplies	and	produce	large	
amounts	of	potable	water.	They	may	carry	helicopters,	small	boats,	and	landing	craft	that	can	
provide	access	to	remote	locations	ashore.	Prepared	for	combat	and	other	emergencies,	many	
vessels	have	medical	facilities	staffed	by	trained	professionals.	Large	ships	built	for	amphibious	
operations	are	especially	prized	for	humanitarian	response	because	most	have	all	of	these	
attributes.		
	
Helping	others	in	times	of	crisis,	alleviating	suffering,	and	saving	lives	has	intrinsic	
value.		Countless	Sailors	and	Marines	who	have	responded	to	humanitarian	crises	have	testified	
how	rewarding	the	experience	was	to	them.	But	the	nation-states	sending	those	forces	into	
disaster	zones	seek	other	rewards	as	well.		
	
Naval	diplomacy,	or	“showing	the	flag,”	has	long	been	a	naval	mission.	Thucydides	
wrote	of	the	Athenian	fleet:	“they	would	…	pass	along	the	coast	before	the	eyes	of	the	other	
cities	and	display	the	visible	power	of	Athens.”	Showing	the	flag	can	be	relatively	benign,	as	
when	Theodore	Roosevelt	sent	the	“Great	White	Fleet”	around	the	world	to	demonstrate	
America’s	arrival	as	a	global	power.2		Alternatively,	showing	the	flag	can	take	the	more	
aggressive	approach	of	“gunboat	diplomacy.”	This	need	not	entail	violence,	as	when	President	
Clinton	deployed	two	carrier	strike	groups	in	1996	in	a	show	of	force	to	respond	to	Chinese	
threats	against	Taiwan.	But	it	can	-	as	in	1896	when	five	Royal	Navy	warships	bombarded	the	
                                                
2	The	Great	White	Fleet	responded	twice	to	humanitarian	crises	during	its	voyage,	diverting	from	its	pre-assigned	
mission.	The	first	time	came	when	the	Fleet	pulled	into	San	Francisco	to	provide	aid	after	the	1906	earthquake.	In	
1908,	after	an	earthquake	and	tsunami	devastated	Sicily	and	southern	Italy,	the	Fleet	again	stopped	to	render	
assistance.	Elleman,	Bruce	A.	Waves	of	Hope:	The	US	Navy’s	Response	to	the	Tsunami	in	Northern	Indonesia,	Naval	
War	College,	Newport	Paper	#	28.	Newport,	RI:	Naval	War	College	Press	(2007),	p.	5.	
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Sultan’s	Palace	in	Zanzibar	to	induce	the	pro-German	occupant	to	abdicate	in	favor	of	a	
candidate	more	acceptable	to	the	British.3		
	
“Gunboat	diplomacy,”	especially	when	it	includes	real,	physical	attacks,	is	redolent	of	
the	colonial	era,	of	forceful	coercion	of	the	weak	by	the	strong,	and	is	therefore	rarely	regarded	
as	acceptable	now.	In	recent	years,	numerous	factors,	to	include	the	UN	Charter	and	the	fear	of	
major,	possibly	nuclear,	war,	have	led	to	the	promotion	of	“soft	power”	initiatives	rather	than	
the	blunt	instrument	of	military	might.		Consequently,	the	more	benign	aspects	of	showing	the	
flag	are	now	far	more	firmly	entrenched	in	naval	doctrine	and	accepted	in	practice	than	was	
true	a	century	ago.		
	
Joseph	Nye,	perhaps	the	best-known	proponent	of	the	soft	power	concept,	has	written:	
 
A	country’s	soft	power	can	come	from	three	resources:	its		
culture	(in	places	where	it	is	attractive	to	others),	its	political	
values	(when	it	lives	up	to	them	at	home	and	abroad),	and	its		
foreign	policies	(when	they	are	seen	as	legitimate	and	having		
moral	authority).4		
 
Similarly,	scholar	Amitai	Etzioni	has	noted	“the	merits	of	soft	power	and	the	role	
legitimacy	plays	in	commanding	such	power.”5	Nations	that	are	respected	for	their	legitimacy	
generally	find	it	easier	to	gain	allies	and	partners,	and	to	achieve	their	goals.	
	
Providing	aid	to	countries	shattered	by	disaster	can	thus	be	attractive	to	other	nations	
for	the	very	pragmatic	reason	that	it	demonstrates	appealing	political	values	and	foreign	
policies	(and	perhaps,	even,	culture),	thereby	enhancing	national	legitimacy,	power	and	
prestige.		
 
Diplomacy	also	means	lending	a	helping	hand	where	that	can	
be	efficient	and	effective.	Disaster	relief	is	one	such	opportunity.	
Although	not	a	magic	wand,	the	US	military’s	relief	efforts	after	
the	Asian	tsunami	on	December	26,	2004,	seem	to	have	been	
somewhat	effective	in	developing	more	positive	views	of	the	
United	States,	although	similar	efforts	in	Pakistan	did	not	produce	
similar	results.6	
                                                
3	Speller,	Ian.	Understanding	Naval	Warfare.	New	York:	Routledge	(2014),	p.	75.	The	bombardment	lasted	only	38	
minutes	before	the	Sultan	recognized	the	error	of	his	ways.	The	Guinness	Book	of	World	Records	honors	this	as	the	
shortest	war	in	history. 
4	Nye,	Joseph	S.,	Jr.	“Think	Again:	Soft	Power,”	Foreign	Policy,	http://foreignpolicy.com/2006/02/23/think-again-
soft-power.	Accessed	10/15/2016.	
5	Etzioni,	Amitai.	Security	First	–	For	a	Muscular,	Moral	Foreign	Policy.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press	(2007),	p.	
33.	
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A	well-known	Pew	Research	study	showed	that,	while	the	2003	invasion	of	Iraq	soured	
the	opinion	many	Indonesians	held	of	the	U.S.,	their	perceptions	of	the	U.S.	improved	as	a	
result	of	the	2004	tsunami	relief	effort.	However,	this	eroded	somewhat	over	time.	Pew	studies	
of	the	2005	US	relief	efforts	in	Pakistan	showed	no	such	improvement	in	Pakistani	popular	
opinion	of	the	US.	The	conclusion	reached	was	that	the	beneficial	response	in	public	perception	
required	a	pre-existing	reservoir	of	goodwill	toward	the	US,	something	that	had	existed	in	
Indonesia	to	a	far	greater	degree	than	it	had	in	Pakistan	for	some	time.7	
	
Nonetheless,	naval	foreign	disaster	relief	operations	do	tend	to	bolster	military-to-
military	and	government-to-government	relations	and	they	can	add	to	the	perceived	legitimacy	
of	the	responding	nations.	Responsive	relief	operations	also	contribute	to	maintaining	
international	order	and	preserving	stability	in	the	affected	nation.	The	Indian	Navy	thus	looks	to	
establish	itself	as	a	regional	leader	in	humanitarian	assistance	/	disaster	relief	(HADR)	
operations,	while	the	Brazilian	Navy	highly	values	their	marines	and	amphibious	forces	for	their	
ability	to	conduct	“soft”	security	operations,	such	as	HADR.	Regularly	beset	by	natural	disasters,	
Indonesia	designed	and	built	five	large	amphibious	ships,	with	disaster	relief	one	of	their	
primary	missions.	In	fact,	the	Indonesian	Navy	has	converted	one	of	these	to	a	hospital	ship.	
One	rationale	the	Royal	Australian	Navy	gives	for	building	a	new	class	of	amphibious	warfare	
ships	is	their	suitability	for	humanitarian	operations.	
	
When	the	Chinese	Navy	commissioned	the	hospital	ship	Daisha	Dao	(translated	as	
“Peace	Ark”)	at	the	end	of	2008,	many	Western	observers	concluded	that	the	ship	had	been	
developed	in	the	wake	of	the	2004	tsunami	relief	effort	and	Beijing’s	inability	to	participate	in	a	
more	significant	-	and	visible	-	way	to	that	effort.	Qu	Zhaowei,	a	Chinese	naval	analyst,	has	
described	the	ship	as	a	“new	means	to	influence	developing	countries.”8		But	when	Haiyan	hit	
the	Philippines,	China	–	in	the	midst	of	territorial	disputes	with	the	Philippines	-	pledged	a	
comparatively	small	sum	of	funds	for	typhoon	relief,	and	the	Peace	Ark	stayed	in	port.	Only	
after	China	was	criticized	for	its	paltry	response	did	the	hospital	ship	finally	get	underway	for	
the	Philippines,	almost	two	weeks	after	the	typhoon	had	hit.	Even	where	there	is	capability,	
political	considerations	may	affect	the	decision	how	and	whether	to	respond	to	a	foreign	
nation’s	crisis.	
	
				 Countries	recognize	-	in	part	based	on	the	Pew	studies	of	Indonesian	attitudes	following	
the	tsunami	response	-	that	to	maximize	the	benefits	they	gain	with	affected-nation	
populations	by	conducting	disaster	response	and	humanitarian	assistance	operations	they	must	
                                                                                                                                                       
6	Posen,	Barry	R.	Restraint:	A	New	Foundation	for	US	Grand	Strategy.	Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press	(2014),	p.	
86.  
7	Ibid.,	p.	203	fn	#	37,	citing	Pew	Global	Attitudes	Project,	March	6,	2012.		
8	Averett,	Leah.	“China’s	Growing	Maritime	HA/DR	Capabilities,”	Jamestown	Foundation	China	Brief,	Vol.	10,	Issue	
12.	June	11,	2010.	https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-growing-maritime-hadr-capabilities/.	Accessed	
10/15/2016.		
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follow	up	and	maintain	regular	contact.		Forward	deployed	naval	forces	are	useful,	visible	
assets	to	execute	these	missions.		
	
Thus,	the	US	Navy	returns	regularly	to	the	Philippines	and	other	Asian	nations	as	part	of	
its	Pacific	Partnership	Program,	said	to	be	“the	largest	annual	multilateral	humanitarian	
assistance	and	disaster	relief	preparedness	mission	conducted	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region.”9	
Pacific	Partnership	2014	included	port	visits	in	Vietnam	and	Cambodia	as	well	as	the	
Philippines.	US	Navy	and	Japanese	Maritime	Self	Defense	Force	Sailors,	and	Australian	soldiers	
participated	in	the	mission,	which	featured	the	offering	of	veterinary	and	medical	clinics,	
engineering	projects,	and	professional	medical	exchanges	and	seminars.		Such	deployments	
feature	prominently	in	US	regional	commanders’	theater	security	cooperation	plans	for	building	
goodwill.		
	
Last	year	found	Peace	Ark,	the	Chinese	hospital	ship,	conducting	Harmonious	Mission	-	
2015,	in	which	the	ship	visited	Malaysia,	Australia,	French	Polynesia,	the	U.S.,	Mexico,	
Barbados,	Grenada,	and	Peru	for	“military	diplomacy,	medical	exchange	and	cultural	
communication”	including	the	provision	of	“free	medical	and	humanitarian	services.”10	
	
Naval	assets	can	bring	unique	capabilities	to	humanitarian	response	operations	that	
greatly	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	those	operations.	But	they	do	not	come	without	a	price	
tag,	for	the	commitment	of	forces	to	foreign	disaster	relief	is	always	a	political	act,	always	an	
expression	of	the	responding	government’s	foreign	policy	-	and	those	governments	will	
generally	hope	to	garner	rewards	for	their	efforts,	those	principally	being	enhanced	legitimacy	
and	stronger	ties	with	the	affected	nation	and	within	the	region.	It	is	this	that	distinguishes	
naval	or	military	units	-	or	any	governmental	organization	-	from	humanitarian	organizations.	
Sailors,	Marines	and	relief	workers	from	NGOs	might	work	side	by	side	to	deliver	medical	
supplies	and	food	to	stranded	victims	of	an	earthquake,	but	the	sailors	and	Marines	are	not	
humanitarians.	Humanitarian	organizations	and	their	personnel	are	governed	by	four	principles	
-	humanity,	neutrality,	impartiality	and	independence.11	Even	if	a	nation’s	armed	forces	could,	
in	some	circumstances,	demonstrate	humanity,	if,	in	some	environments,	they	could	be	neutral	
and	impartial,	they	can	never	be	independent	as	defined	in	these	principles.		
	
                                                
9	Oseguera,	Karolina	A.,	PO2,	“Pacific	Partnership	Completes	Philippines	Mission,”	
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id+82223	,	July	15,	2014.	Accessed	10/15/2016.		
10	“Chinese	Hospital	Ship	Peace	Ark	set	out	for	‘Harmonious	Mission	–	2015,’	
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-09/25/content_4622247.htm	,	Sept.	25,	2015.	Accessed	10/18/2016.		
11	Humanity:	Human	suffering	must	be	addressed	wherever	it	is	found.	The	purpose	of	humanitarian	action	is	to	
protect	life	and	health	and	ensure	respect	for	human	beings.	Neutrality:	Humanitarian	actors	must	not	take	sides	
in	hostilities	or	engage	in	controversies	of	a	political,	racial,	religious	or	ideological	nature.	Impartiality:	
Humanitarian	action	must	be	carried	out	on	the	basis	of	need	alone,	giving	priority	to	the	most	urgent	cases	of	
distress	and	making	no	distinctions	on	the	basis	of	nationality,	race,	gender,	religious	belief,	class	or	political	
opinions.	Independence:	Humanitarian	action	must	be	autonomous	from	the	political,	economic,	military	or	other	
objectives	that	any	actor	may	hold	with	regard	to	areas	where	humanitarian	action	is	being	implemented.	“OCHA	
on	Message:	Humanitarian	Principles,”	docs.ocha.org. 
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Much	of	the	debate	around	military-humanitarian	coordination	focuses	on	the	
operational	issues	around	military	contributions	as	an	‘option	of	last	resort’	in	humanitarian	
emergency	response.	Far	less	attention	has	been	paid	–	in	policy,	practice	or	research	–	to	the	
exchange	and	diffusion	of	dual-use	innovations	and	good	practices	both	communities	share	
between	crises.		
	
This	is	a	missed	opportunity.	Humanitarians	can	learn	a	tremendous	amount	from	
military	innovation	–	and	visa-versa.	As	the	British	Red	Cross	NGO	Military	Contact	Group	
recently	noted,	‘[t]here	is	clearly	a	lot	of	research	and	development	that	originates	in	the	
military	community	that	could	provide	real	benefit	to	the	humanitarian	community	and	
populations	on	the	ground’	(2015:	6).	The	King’s	College	Humanitarian	Futures	Programme	
(2011:	34)	likewise	point	out	that	‘crisis	management	could	potentially	be	enhanced	by	
exposing	humanitarian	organisations	to	military	communities	that	regularly	meet	the	challenge	
of	innovation’.	
	
The	topic	of	military-humanitarian	knowledge	exchange	is	extremely	timely	for	the	
humanitarian	sector,	which	has	recently	come	to	embrace	innovation	as	a	key	priority.	A	
growing	network	of	innovation	units	based	across	leading	humanitarian	NGOs	and	the	UN	
system,	including	a	number	of	UN	innovation	labs,	funding	mechanisms	like	the	Humanitarian	
Innovation	Fund,	and	academic	initiatives	such	as	the	Oxford	Humanitarian	Innovation	Project	
and	the	Harvard	Humanitarian	Initiative,	are	seeking	to	improving	the	humanitarian	sector’s	
collective	capacity	for	innovation	and	rapid	iterative	change	management	by	facilitating	and	
foster	promising	new	products,	processes,	and	innovation	management	approaches	(Betts	and	
Bloom,	2015).	
	
As	part	of	this	humanitarian	innovation	agenda,	there	is	a	new	interest	across	the	
humanitarian	sector	in	borrowing	transferable	models,	inspirations	and	good	practice	from	
outside	the	‘closed	loop’	of	established	aid	sector	thinking.	Increasingly,	humanitarian	
innovators	are	reaching	out	to	non-traditional	innovation	learning	partners,	primarily	the	
private	sector,	for	new	thinking.	There	has	been	very	little	concerted	thinking	to	date,	however,	
about	how	military	actors	and	the	wider	defence	sector	might	(or	in	fact,	already	do)	intersect	
with	this	rapidly-evolving	humanitarian	innovation	ecosystem.	
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Over	the	last	two	years,	our	team	at	the	Oxford	Humanitarian	Innovation	Project	(HIP)	
has	sought	to	develop	a	holistic	research	agenda	for	better	understanding	these	under-
explored	opportunities	–	and	risks	–	which	militaries	represent	for	the	humanitarian	innovation	
agenda.	(For	a	fuller	discussion,	see	Kaplan	&	Easton-Calabria	2016).	We	argue	there	are	major	
gains	to	be	made	from	both	communities	working	closer	together	–	both	in	catalysing	the	
diffusion	of	useful	lessons-learning,	and	at	the	same	time,	offering	a	novel	conceptual	space	for	
civil-military	engagement.		
	
Military-Humanitarian	Innovation	Learning:	Identifying	Opportunities….	
As	militaries	are	drawn	with	increasing	frequency	into	humanitarian	and	development	
missions,	their	own	large,	well-resourced	and	optimised	innovation	systems	are	increasingly	
confronting	design	challenges	with	significant	overlap	to	those	facing	the	aid	community.	This	
evolving	military	innovation	ecosystem,	Kent	and	Ratcliffe	(2008:	xii)	write,	already	contains	
‘numerous	projects	[that]	could	be	adapted	to	humanitarian	purposes’.	
	
A	necessary	first	step	for	such	synergistic	learning	agendas	is	to	thus	map	the	most	
relevant	points	of	transferable	learning.	Within	these	areas	of	overlap,	specific	defence-sector	
products,	processes,	and	approaches	to	innovation	management	can	invite	evidence-based	
field	research	and	detailed	case	studies,	which	explore	respective	strengths	and	weaknesses	in	
their	past	or	future	adaption	to	humanitarian	use.	
	
Such	synergistic	learning	is	by	no	means	a	straightforward	exercise.	As	Ramalingam	et	
al.	(2015:	64)	warn,	while	humanitarian	innovators	‘might	look	to	military	innovation	(...)	as	a	
source	of	useful	ideas’,	such	lessons-learning	must	first	account	for	major	fundamental	
‘differences	in	goals,	cultures,	incentives	and	mind-sets’	between	military	organisations	and	
their	humanitarian	counterparts,	alongside	‘considerable	difference	in	available	resources’,	
‘emphasis	placed	on	training	and	skills’,	and	‘relative	maturity	and	awareness	of	innovation	as	a	
concept	and	a	practice’.		
	
These	are	important	considerations.	One	clear	starting	point,	however,	is	to	first	focus	on	
areas	in	which	military	innovation	have	already	been	adopted	by	humanitarians	in	their	day-to-
day	work.	Indeed,	multiple	examples	of	civil-military	innovation	diffusion	already	exist	across	
the	humanitarian	sector,	from	products	and	processes	to	models	of	innovation	management	
itself.	For	example:	
	
• Product	Innovations:	The	defence	sector	is	directly	responsible	for	the	foundations	of	
many	of	modern	information	communication	technologies	(ICTs)	that	are	a	primary	
focus	of	humanitarian	innovation	discussions	to	date.	Defence	R&D	is	invested	heavily	in	
the	development	of	emerging	technologies	with	obvious	and	potentially	disruptive	
implications	for	natural	disaster	response,	such	as	Terahertz-range	communications,	
improved	geo-location	technology	using	the	Earth’s	magnetic	field	instead	of	expensive	
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satellite	infrastructures1,	and	remote-controlled	robotics	for	natural	disaster	
environments.2	In	the	area	of	remote-sensing,	UAVs	are	rapidly	entering	mainstream	
practice	as	NGOs	increasingly	rely	on	‘drones’	for	crisis	mapping,	search	and	rescue	and,	
more	recently,	logistics.		
	
Such	civil-military	innovation	synergy	is	also	well-evidenced	in	the	area	of	emergency	
medicine	and	humanitarian	public	health,	where	military	biomedical	research	has	
further	contributed	to	major	innovations	in	parasitology,	key	anti-malarial	drugs,	and	
the	development	of	a	wide	range	of	vaccines	against	communicable	diseases.		For	
example,	during	the	West	African	Ebola	response,	vaccine	development	drew	upon	
knowledge	accrued	through	significant	US	military	biomedical	research	on	Ebola	(Kaplan	
and	Easton-Calabria	2015).	The	US	government’s	Defense	Advanced	Research	Projects	
Agency	(DARPA)	recently	initiated	the	Rapid	Threat	Assessment	(RTA)	program,	a	five-
year	initiative	to	create	new	technologies	for	accelerated	diagnosis	of	biological	and	
chemical	threat	agents.			
	
• Process	Innovations:	At	the	same	time,	many	of	the	most	relevant	and	transferable	
innovations	militaries	possess	for	informing	humanitarian	organisation’s	own	practices	
are	not	physical	products	and	technologies	at	all,	but	rather	process	innovations	which	
are	scalable	to	smaller,	resource-constrained	civilian	organisations.	
	
Humanitarian	planning	processes,	for	instance,	remain	inconsistent,	limited	by	pervasive	
reactivity,	short	planning	horizons,	a	lack	of	commonality	between	various	
organisational	planning	processes,	and	unclear	end-state	objectives	in	both	strategy	and	
programme	design.	Such	approaches	contrast	strongly	with	military	approaches	to	
planning,	which	tend	to	leverage	similar	frameworks,	large-scale	information	networks,	
strong	institutional	support	for	strategic	planning,	defined,	proven	processes	and	
models	for	establishing	clear	goals.	Indeed,	although	rarely	acknowledged,	several	of	
the	most	widely-used	tools	in	humanitarian	planning	–	including	the	ubiquitous	logical	
framework	and	after-action	reviews,	have	military	origins.	(Hummelbrunner,	in	Fujita,	
ed.	2010:	1).	This	suggests	another	area	wherein	the	adaptation	of	principles	underlying	
military	processes,	particularly	around	strategic	planning,	horizon-scanning	and	risk	
planning	hold	strong	relevance	for	humanitarian	practice.		
	
Other	learning	opportunities	exist,	for	instance,	in	military	simulation	and	gaming	
approaches,	are	often	done	at	a	scale	and	sophistication	far	beyond	humanitarian	
organisations	(Kent	and	Ratcliffe	2008:	33).	Militaries	are	also	extremely	creative	in	
strategies	for	rebuilding	disrupted	supply	chains	and	circumventing	logistical	challenges	
in	conflict	and	natural	disasters	(Pettit	and	Beresford	2007).	Process	innovations	can	
                                                
1 DARPA  (2015) ‘Quantum-Assisted Sensing and Readout’.  
http://www.darpa.mil/program/quantum-assisted-sensing-and-readout.(accessed 26/10/2015). 
2 DARPA Robotics Challenge (2015) ‘DARPA Robotics Challenge’. http://www.theroboticschallenge.org/. (accessed 
26/10/2015). 
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also	use	military	methodologies	for	streamlining	and	fusing	different	intelligence	
sources	–	geospatial,	human,	signals,	open-source	–	for	real-time	analysis	and	better	
situational	awareness	of	the	humanitarian	space	(HHI	reference).				
	
• Innovation	Management:	Lastly,	military	approaches	to	managing	innovation	processes	
themselves	hold	valuable	lessons	for	humanitarian	innovators.		In	a	recent	report	for	the	
World	Humanitarian	Summit,	for	instance,	Deloitte	(2015a:	8)	notes	the	‘high’	relevance	
of	US	military’s	approaches	to	innovation	management	for	humanitarian	innovation	
lessons-learning,	particularly	its	‘strong	centralized	governing	body	processes	to	source	
and	disseminate	innovations’	and	‘rigorous	training	institutions,	systems,	and	doctrine’.		
	
Models	for	new	innovation	and	lessons-learning	management	include,	for	instance,	the	
US	Navy	Centre	for	Excellence	in	Disaster	Management	and	the	US	Army	Center	for	
Army	Lessons	Learned	(CALL).		For	product	innovation	management,	DARPA’s	unique	
approach	to	innovation	management	clearly	shows	returns	that	risk-friendly	spaces	
bring.	In	the	field,	the	US	Army	Rapid	Equipping	Force	(REF)	offers	a	new	model	for	rapid	
design,	testing,	and	scaling	of	product	innovations.	
	
…and	Risks	
There	is	an	equally	important	need	to	critically	engage	with	the	risks	and	implications	
innovation	diffusion	may	pose	to	humanitarian	principles,	particularly	neutrality,	impartiality,	
and	operational	independence.	The	rapid	and	often	disruptive	impact	of	new	products	and	
processes	diffused	from	military	to	humanitarian	space	raise	important	considerations	and	real	
challenges	for	humanitarian	principles.	These	issues,	however,	are	under-addressed	by	most	
humanitarian	innovation	discussions	to	date.		
	
Many	principle-based	issues	are	concretized	in	the	evolving	application	of	specific	
military-derived	ICT	innovations	in	the	humanitarian	space.	Real	and	perceived	risks	to	data	
confidentiality,	and	increasing	reliance	by	humanitarian	organisations	on	‘data	philanthropy’	
from	government	and	military	intelligence	pose	growing	challenges	to	humanitarian	
impartiality	(Raymond	and	Card	2015:	7).	Humanitarian	organisations	must	also	understand	the	
political	economy	of	dual-use	products	which	suppliers	market	to	both	military	and	
humanitarian	markets,	a	contentious	issue	recently	raised	by	proliferation	of	humanitarian	
‘drones’	(Sandvik	and	Lohne	2014).		
	
Work	on	professional	principle-based	frameworks	for	humanitarian	innovation	has	
recently	begun,	and	require	much	further	conceptual	development	(HIP	2015).	It	will	be	
essential	for	this	valuable	emerging	critical	discourse	to	fully	confront	the	implications	of	
militaries	operating	as	brokers	of	ICT	assets,	capabilities,	and	data	to	humanitarian	
organisations,	and	that	this	debate	is	underpinned	by	solid	research	and	evidence.		
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Steps	Forward	
Moving	forward,	we	argue	need	for	greater	action,	through	collaborative	dialogue	and	
debate,	around	opportunities,	challenges,	and	critical	implications	of	innovation	diffusion	and	
exchange	between	military	and	humanitarian	space.	There	is	greater	potential	than	is	currently	
realised	for	military,	humanitarian	and	academic	innovation	experts	to	directly	engage	through	
active	co-learning,	with	military	actors	sharing	good	practice,	technical	expertise	and	insights	
into	military	innovations	with	potential	dual-use	value	for	humanitarian	adoption.		
	
At	the	same	time,	it	is	essential	that	such	learning	engagement	adhere	strictly	to	
established	civil-military	coordination	guidance	and	clear	boundaries	which	respect	and	
maintain	humanitarian	neutrality.	For	this	reason,	military	contributions	to	humanitarian	
innovation	learning	should	occur	at	times	and	places	well	away	from	active	emergency	
response.	Utmost	care	must	be	taken	in	addressing	sensitivities	around	information-sharing	
and	data	privacy	between	both	communities,	even	in	such	informal	lessons-learning	exchange	
(Metcalfe	et	al	2012:	27).		
	
Leading	convenors	of	civil-humanitarian	dialogue	–	such	as	InterAction,	the	United	
States	Institute	of	Peace	(USIP),	the	British	Red	Cross	NGO-Military	Contact	Group	(NMCG),	the	
Center	for	Civil-Military	Excellence	(CCOE),	and,	most	critically,	UN	OCHA	CMCoord	–	already	
bring	together	civilian,	military,	government,	and	academia	for	collaborative	knowledge-
exchange	through	trusted	networks.	They	are	natural	starting	points	for	hosting	conversations	
around	innovation	diffusion	and	exchange	between	militaries	and	humanitarians,	through	
workshops,	seminars,	and	conferences.	Academia	also	can	convene	military-humanitarian	
dialogue	around	innovation	in	a	neutral,	safe	environment,	moderated	under	a	format	which	
permits	anonymity	and	frankness	(i.e.	Chatham	House	rules).		
	
Given	the	diversity	of	military	actors	worldwide,	it	is	also	essential	to	consult	with	as	
wide	a	diversity	of	military	stakeholders	as	possible,	and	notably	national	militaries	from	the	
Global	South	and	middle-income	countries.	As	the	most	frequent	first	responders	to	
humanitarian	natural	disasters,	these	forces	possess	unique	perspectives	that	may	provide	
some	of	the	most	innovative	new	ideas	for	humanitarian	practice.		
	
Active	co-learning	between	military	actors	and	humanitarians	will	never	be	easy,	but	the	
challenge	is	well	worth	facing.	Military-humanitarian	innovation	represents	a	gap	in	broader	
civil-military	research	agendas,	and	potentially	offers	a	novel	opportunity	for	constructive	
dialogue	between	two	communities	regularly	stymied	in	other	traditional	arenas	of	
engagement.		
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Operational Humanitarian Civil-Military 
Coordination 
__________________________________________ 
Michael Marx 
United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) 
Coordination	between	humanitarian	and	military	actors	in	large-scale	natural	disasters	
has	improved	significantly	over	the	last	decade.	The	lessons	from	recent	large-scale	disasters,	
starting	with	the	Asia	Tsunami	response	in	2004,	have	led	to	marked	improvements	in	the	
effectiveness	and	efficiency	of	natural	disaster	response.	Response	operations	in	Indonesia,	Sri	
Lanka,	Pakistan,	Haiti,	and	the	Philippines	has	demonstrated	that	military	assets,	in	particular	
Foreign	Military	Assets	(FMA),	can	provide	timely,	unique,	and	critical	capabilities,	especially	in	
the	early	phases	of	a	response	operation.			
	
However,	there	still	exists	the	need	for	better	coordination	between	humanitarian	and	
military	actors,	particularly	in	the	areas	of	information	sharing,	gaining	common	situational	
awareness,	and	deploying	assets	based	on	identified	needs	on	the	ground.	When	decisions	are	
made	to	accept	and	deploy	FMA,	there	has	rarely	been	a	shortfall	in	the	number	of	assets	that	
are	deployed;	however,	increased	focus	should	be	on	deploying	the	right	types	of	assets	to	
produce	the	desired	impact	on	the	ground.		Two	common	challenges	to	a	coordinated	response	
are	in	the	ability	of	the	affected	country	to	receive,	integrate,	and	coordinate	the	FMA	that	is	
arriving,	and	for	assisting	nations	to	deploy	the	right	capacity	to	provide	effective	and	rapid	
assistance	to	the	affected	people.	Part	of	the	challenge	is	related	to	problems	in	assessment	
methodology	and	in	gaining	a	common	situational	awareness	quickly	enough	to	assist	decision	
makers	in	deploying	the	appropriate	military	capacity.	There	is	a	tendency	for	nations	to	deploy	
FMA	because	it	is	available	or	in	the	proximity	of	the	disaster	–	to	push	assets	from	overseas	
rather	than	to	pull	assets	forward	based	on	the	assessed	needs	on	the	ground.	The	number	of	
nations	deploying	FMA	in	response	to	large-scale	natural	disasters	–	often	25	to	35	nations	
responding	in	each	of	the	major	disasters	over	the	last	decade	–	can	create	significant	problems	
and	competition	on	the	ground,	especially	when	there	are	limited	ports	of	entry	into	the	
affected	area.	This	is	further	complicated	by	the	deployment	of	hundreds	of	humanitarian	
organizations	from	the	United	Nations,	Non-Governmental	Organizations	(NGOs),	and	the	Red	
Cross	and	Red	Crescent	Movement.			
	
There	are	military	capabilities	that	are	commonly	needed	in	many	large-scale	disaster	
response	operations,	including:	air	lift	and	ground	transportation,	production	of	potable	water,	
logistics	planning	and	execution,	engineering	and	the	restoration	of	the	humanitarian	
infrastructure	(repairing	and	clearing	roads,	restoring	bridges,	ports,	airports,	and	removing	
rubble	and	other	debris	in	order	to	open	up	lines	of	communication),	specific	medical/surgical	
capability,	information	technology,	and	operational	planning.	Several	nations	have	organized	
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their	military	disaster	response	to	meet	these	common	needs,	utilizing	a	modular	approach	that	
can	be	tailored	to	meet	the	needs	on	the	ground.	
	
Naval	services	often	have	many	or	all	of	these	capacities	within	their	organizational	
structure.	The	U.S.	military	sea	services,	because	of	its	global	presence,	ability	to	project	
capability	and	tailor	its	organization,	and	rapid	decision	making	by	the	national	command	
authority,	is	often	critically	positioned	to	respond	quickly	with	many	of	the	right	capabilities	to	
meet	the	needs	on	the	ground.		Maximizing	this	effect	requires	preparation	that	includes	
dedicated	training	and	exercising	to	meet	this	mission	set,	improving	disaster	response	
doctrine,	establishing	and	maintaining	networks	and	contacts	–	both	within	the	military	
communities	and	with	humanitarian	response	organizations,	and	developing	relevant	standard	
operating	procedures,	plans,	and	agreements	(military	to	military	and	military	to	humanitarian).	
	
The	United	Nations	Office	for	the	Coordination	for	Humanitarian	Assistance	(UN	OCHA)	
is	mandated	by	General	Assembly	Resolution	46/182	to	coordinate	the	overall	relief	effort,	in	
support	of	the	affected	nation,	and	to	serve	as	the	focal	point	for	humanitarian	civil-military	
coordination,	both	for	the	United	Nations	system,	as	well	as	for	the	broader	humanitarian	
community.	UN	Humanitarian	Civil-Military	Coordination	(UN-CMCoord)	facilitates	dialogue	and	
interaction	between	civilian	and	military	actors	which	is	essential	to	protect	and	promote	
humanitarian	principles,	avoid	competition,	minimize	inconsistency	and,	when	appropriate,	
pursue	common	goals.		OCHA	is	also	one	of	the	few	humanitarian	agencies	with	dedicated	civil-
military	capacity	within	its	organization,	with	humanitarian	civil-military	coordination	(UN-
CMCoord)	officers	at	headquarters	and	deployed	in	relief	operations.	
	
OCHA’s	role	in	humanitarian	civil-military	coordination	is	to	facilitate	effective	
coordination	between	humanitarian	and	military	actors	in	both	the	preparedness	and	response	
phases,	bringing	together	policy	and	guidance,	operational	support,	and	a	training	program	for	
the	humanitarian	and		military	communities.	OCHA	also	serves	as	the	custodian	for	the	various	
sets	of	global	and	country	specific	guidelines,	operational	guidance,	and	handbooks,	including	
the	Guidelines	on	the	Use	of	Foreign	Military	and	Civil	Defence	Assets	in	Disaster	Relief,	or	the	
“Oslo	Guidelines”.	For	military	actors,	OCHA	can	serve	as	the	“front	door”	to	the	humanitarian	
community,	providing	information,	contact	points,	and	operational	coordination	on	the	ground.		
OCHA	is	currently	leading	a	humanitarian	community-wide	effort	to	develop	an	updated	set	of	
Humanitarian	Civil-Military	Standards,	that	will	serve	as	a	commonly	agreed	approach	to	
humanitarian-military	interaction,	decision-making,	information	sharing,	employment	of	assets,	
and	the	transition	of	military	capacities	back	to	civilian	and	humanitarian	led	capabilities.		The	
overall	aim	is	to	improve	the	predictability,	effectiveness,	efficiency,	and	coherence	in	
deploying	and	employing	military	assets,	and	to	ensure	a	clear	distinction	between	the	
humanitarian	and	military	communities	is	maintained	in	line	with	principled	humanitarian	
assistance.	The	Standards	will	also	help	reduce	the	burden	on	the	affected	Member	State	in	
receiving,	integrating,	and	coordinating	FMAs.	
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OCHA’s	UN-CMCoord	Training	Program	provides	various	levels	of	training	for	
humanitarian	and	military	actors.	The	UN-CMCoord	Course	brings	together	humanitarian	and	
military	practitioners	to	familiarize	participants	with	humanitarian	civil-military	coordination	
concepts	and	principles	and	its	practical	applications	in	the	field.	Because	it	is	conducted	at	the	
regional	level,	it	assists	in	addressing	regional-specific	challenges	and	contexts,	brings	together	
practitioners	who	work	or	will	work	together,	and	establishes	effective	operational	networks.	
OCHA	also	provides	other	levels	of	training,	including	the	Supporting	Humanitarian	Action	in	
Emergencies	and	Disasters	(SHARED)	Course	and	the	SHARED	Training	of	Trainers	(ToT)	Course,	
both	of	which	are	designed	specifically	for	a	military	audience	and	can	be	tailored	to	meet	
operational	or	geographic	needs.	Another	advantage	of	the	training	program	is	that	it	provides	
access	to	an	existing	network	of	close	to	4,000	military	and	humanitarian	disaster	practitioners,	
both	on	the	ground	in	disasters	and	virtually	through	several	on-line	platforms.	
	
While	improvements	in	coordination	between	humanitarian	and	military	actors	have	
certainly	been	made,	there	remains	a	requirement	to	improve	the	efficiency	of	humanitarian	
civil-military	response	operations.	Much	of	this	can	be	realized	through	collaborative	training,	
realistic	exercises,	cultivating	operational	networks,	and	establishing	the	substantive	dialogue	
and	information	sharing	platforms	that	are	needed	to	respond	more	effectively	in	future	
emergencies.	
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Civil-Military Coordination in a World with 
Interlocking Threats: Why Urbanization and 
Climate Change Require a More Sophisticated 
Approach 
__________________________________________ 
 
Ronak B. Patel, MD, MPH 
Stanford University Medical School 
 
Two	of	the	most	recognized	trends	in	humanitarian	discourse	seem	to	be	that	of	climate	
change	and	urbanization,	but	their	multiple	interactions	with	each	other	as	well	as	
displacement,	pandemics	and	conflict	are	less	discussed.	These	more	complex	threats,	their	
ramifications	and	the	changing	nature	of	humanitarian	response	necessitate	new	examinations	
of	civil-military	coordination.	The	following	note	briefly	introduces	these	complexities	to	inform	
the	workshop	discussion.	
	
Global	average	temperature	is	projected	to	rise	between	2	to	3	degrees	Celsius	by	2100	
if	current	commitments	are	kept.	Even	keeping	it	below	2	degrees	by	the	end	of	the	century	
would	require	the	most	aggressive	measures,	which	are	unlikely	to	be	adopted	(IPCC,	2014).	
This	contributes	not	only	to	heat	islands	that	affect	particularly	urban	populations,	but	also	
alters	atmospheric	moisture	content	leading	to	more	frequent	and	more	severe	extreme	
weather	events	(NASEM,	2016).	As	the	global	population	of	coastal	cities	grows,	with	two	thirds	
of	the	world’s	population	living	within	100	miles	of	a	coast	by	2030,	so	too	does	the	risk	to	
urban	populations	grow	due	to	climate	change.	
	
Along	with	temperature	rises,	current	forecasts	by	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	
Climate	Change	(IPCC)	predict	a	global	mean	sea	level	rise	of	0.4	meters	by	2100	in	in	the	
lowest	and	best	case	scenario,	and	up	to	a	meter	in	some	regions	(Church	et	al,	2013).	
Achieving	this	best	case	scenario	requires	urgent	and	drastic	action	by	policy	makers	that	has	
yet	to	materialize.	New	projections	with	unabated	global	emissions	could	lead	up	to	a	two	
meter	sea	level	rise	by	the	end	of	the	century	(DeConto	RM,	Pollard	D.	2016).	Low	lying	coastal	
zones,	those	below	10	meters	are	naturally	the	most	vulnerable.	Recent	projections	in	even	the	
lowest	population	growth	scenarios	place	the	global	population	at	over	1	billion	with	the	
greatest	exposure	in	Asia	and	Africa	(Neumann	et	al.	2015).	The	majority	of	this	population	is	
and	will	increasingly	be	urban	with	most	of	the	world’s	megacities	occupying	this	vulnerable	
geography	(Brown	et	al.	2013).		
	
Extreme	weather	events	are	the	more	directly	identifiable	humanitarian	consequence	
through	weather	related	disasters.	Yet	gradual	sea	level	rise	and	warming	temperatures	in	and	
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of	themselves	have	equally	destructive	consequences	as	they	contribute	to	food	insecurity,	
drive	population	displacement	and	in	some	cases,	conflict.	The	changing	climate	will	impact	
food	production	and	water	availability	through	drought,	flooding,	salinization	and	decreased	
rainfall,	leading	to	infertile	land	causing	multiple	dimensions	of	food	insecurity	(FAO,	2008).	
Furthermore,	changing	climate	will	drive	displacement.	Projections	vary	widely	from	25	million	
to	one	billion	but	most	predict	that	hundreds	of	millions	of	people	will	migrate	due	to	
environmental	change	(IOM,	2014).	While	much	of	this	may	be	predictable,	slow,	and	adaptive,	
for	most	of	the	world’s	poor	it	will	be	unpredictable,	sudden,	and	maladaptive	displacement	
within	and	across	borders.		
	
This	displacement	alone	has	obvious	imperatives	for	humanitarian	action	but	it	can	also	
cascade	into	conflict.	Although	the	causal	links	between	climate	displacement	and	conflict	have	
yet	to	reach	scientific	certainty,	the	pathways	are	becoming	clear	and	more	evident	as	migrants	
can	demographically	and	economically	stress	host	populations	exacerbating	and	igniting	
political	and	ethnic	conflict	(Werz,	Conley,	2012).	Even	temperature	increases,	as	described	
above,	have	been	associated	with	conflict	in	Africa’s	civil	wars	with	a	one-degree	increase	in	
Celsius	linked	to	a	4.5%	increase	in	civil	wars	in	the	same	year.	(Burke	et	al.	2012).	The	
protracted	conflict	in	Darfur	has	been	cited	as	a	prominent	example	of	a	modern	climate	
change	conflict	as	the	displacement	and	violence	have	been	driven	by	drought	(Mazo,	2009).	
These	complications	of	climate	change	exemplify	how	future	threats	will	be	ever	more	
entangled.	
	
Climate	change	will	also	alter	environments	across	the	globe	with	consequences	for	
diseases	and	the	vectors	that	carry	them.	Research	shows	that	climate	change	with	increasing	
temperature	and	greater	humidity	has	increased	the	altitude	and	range	of	Anopheles	
mosquitoes	with	greater	risk	for	Malaria	(McMichael,	A.	J.	et	al,	2004).	While	rates	of	Malaria	
have	fallen	due	to	concerted	anti-Malaria	campaigns,	climate	change	has	spread	the	actual	risk.	
The	Zika	outbreak	represents	another	threat	posed	by	spreading	mosquito	range.	Climate	
change	induced	warming	waters	have	also	highlighted	the	risk	for	Cholera’s	to	spread	beyond	
its	endemic	environments	in	the	Bay	of	Bengal	and	a	few	other	spots	(Rita,	R.	2009).		
	
The	Zika	outbreak	and	indeed	Ebola	as	well	highlight	a	further	risk	with	displacements	
spreading	viruses	that	were	once	isolated	or	self-limiting	diseases	now	reaching	larger	urban	
population	centers	and	threatening	pandemics.	Displacements	into	urban	areas	specifically	and	
those	rapidly	growing	with	large	slum	populations	more	particularly	compound	the	risks	for	
pandemics.	As	the	capacity	of	cities	to	maintain	adequate	basic	services	apply	to	the	health	
care	system,	including	disease	surveillance	and	early	warning,	they	will	become	centers	of	
outbreaks.	With	inadequate	capacity	to	respond,	small	outbreaks	may	go	unnoticed	and	even	
when	identified,	the	ability	to	effectively	respond	in	places	such	as	urban	slums	poses	a	grave	
threat.	The	disastrous	attempt	to	quarantine	the	entire	Liberian	slum	of	West	Point	exemplifies	
the	types	of	practices	to	which	some	cities	may	resort.	This	quarantine	not	only	led	to	increased	
violence	and	a	spike	in	food	prices,	among	other	obvious	limitations,	for	residents	to	access	
basic	services	(Eba,	PM	2014).	The	threat	posed	by	pandemics	is	now	more	daunting	than	ever	
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conceived.	This	most	recent	experience	has	shown	the	future	of	pandemics	may	be	a	terrifying	
one	which	local	governments,	the	humanitarian	community,	and	the	world,	are	ill-equipped	to	
contain,	let	alone	extinguish.	
	
These	interwoven	threats	raise	the	complexity	of	humanitarian	response	and	require	
sophisticated	and	bold	thinking.	As	resilience	becomes	a	driving	principle	in	humanitarian	
assistance	to	address	these	challenges,	coordination	is	paramount.	With	the	multitude	of	actors	
now	involved	in	humanitarian	emergencies	along	with	the	drive	towards	locally	driven	
processes,	civil-military	coordination	will	become	ever	more	challenging.	But	this	new	state	of	
play	may	also	open	opportunities	for	Humanitarian	Assistance	and	Disaster	Response	(HADR)	
work,	specifically	in	HA,	that	is	strategically	valuable	and	contributes	to	building	resilience	for	
local	populations.	South	East	Asia	presents	a	prime	opportunity	to	better	understand	and	
address	these	merging	threats	while	using	military	resources	in	a	manner	that	is	consistent	with	
national	interests.	
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Crisis Affected Populations as Digital Sensors and 
Sensemakers: Implications for Civil-Military 
Coordination During Humanitarian Disasters 
__________________________________________ 
 
Nathaniel A. Raymond, Joanna van der Merwe, and Amin Salameh 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and International Organization for Migration 
 
Civilians	affected	by	natural	disaster,	armed	conflict,	and	political	unrest	are	
traditionally	the	most	valuable	sources	of	situational	awareness	and	sensemaking	about	the	
crises	that	impact	them.	Crisis-affected	people	now	have	at	their	disposal	previously	
unprecedented	capabilities	for	collecting,	analyzing,	and	sharing	information	with	each	other	
and	the	world	in	real-time	during	disasters	in	many	cases.1	
	
The	implications	of	crisis-affected	populations	themselves	becoming	both	digital	sensors	
and	sensemakers	during	crisis	is	altering	the	very	nature	and	meaning	of	“humanitarianism”	in	
the	21st	Century.2	What’s	more,	this	trend	is	fundamentally	transforming	how	and	why	crises	
occur	and	unfold	across	geographic	regions	and	operational	contexts.	This	transformation	is	
also	resulting	in	the	emergence	of	a	humanitarian	data	ecosystem.3		
	
No	longer	are	journalists,	governments,	NGOs,	and	private	sector	entities	alone	the	
primary	generators	of	publicly	available	situational	awareness	during	disasters.	Affected	
populations,	including	refugees	and	internally	displaced	persons	(IDPs)	-	often	through	the	
utilization	of	diaspora	networks	and	instant	messaging	apps	-	are	establishing	sensemaking	
networks	amongst	themselves	and	direct	two	way	communications	with	responders.		
	
This	trend	is	also	creating	new	risks	and	liabilities	for	all	members	of	the	humanitarian	
data	ecosystem	as	well.	The	increasingly	prevalent	use	of	information	communication	
technologies	(ICTs)	and	the	data	they	produce	may,	in	fact,	be	producing	a	new	type	of	crisis:	
“Big	Data	Disasters”.4		
	
                                                
1	Gilman,	D.,	Noyes,	A.	(2013).	Humanitarianism	in	the	Networked	age.	UN	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	
Humanitarian	Affairs.	OCHA	Policy	and	Studies	Series.	Pgs.	14-15.	
2	Raymond,	N.,	Card,	B.	(2015).	Applying	Humanitarian	Principles	to	Current	Uses	of	Information	Communication	
Technologies:	Gaps	in	Doctrine	and	Challenges	to	Practice.	Harvard	Humanitarian	Initiative.	White	Paper.		
3	Berens,	J.,	Raymond,	N.,	Shimshon,	G.,	Verhulst,	S.,	Bernholtz,	L.	(2016).	The	Humanitarian	Data	Ecosystem:	the	
Case	for	Collective	Responsibility.	Centre	for	Innovation.	Insight	Paper.	Data	for	Policy	2016	Conference,	University	
of	Cambridge,	UK.	
4	Raymond,	N.,	Al	Achkar,	Z.	(Forthcoming).	Data	preparedness:	Connecting	data,	decision-making,	and	
humanitarian	response.	UN	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs.	Think	Brief. 
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The	ever	increasing	volumes	of	social	media	and	other	data	generated	by	affected	
populations,	in	some	cases,	is	overwhelming	the	capabilities	of	both	civilian	and	military	actors	
to	digest	and	make	sense	of	it.	This	phenomena	can	be	referred	to	as	“data	deluge”.5	
	
In	other	cases,	the	use	of	ICTs	on	affected	populations	in	experimental	and	unregulated	
ways	by	responders	can	cause	harm	to	the	physical	security	and	human	rights	status	of	crisis-
affected	populations.	This	phenomena	can	be	referred	to	as	“data	damage”.	Both	the	2015	
West	Africa	Ebola	Outbreak6	and	the	use	of	satellite	imagery	to	document	human	rights	abuses	
in	Sudan	reportedly	causing	specific	attacks	on	villages	in	Darfur	are	examples	of	“data	
damage”.7			
	
Rather	than	simply	a	new	set	of	tools	and	techniques	in	new	hands,	the	emergence	of	
affected	community-based	sensors	and	sensemakers	creates	both	transformational	challenges	
to,	and	opportunities	for	civil-military	(civ-mil)	coordination.	These	issues	have	been	left	
relatively	unstudied	to	date	and	are	generally	poorly	understood	-	both	within	military	and	
civilian	communities	alike.8		
	
Those	engaged	in	communications	with	affected	populations	in	the	context	of	the	civ-
mil	space	can	no	longer	view	telecommunications	use	by	crisis-hit	communities	as	only	a	
technical	issue	alone:	The	use	of	ICTs	and	digital	data	by	affected	populations	and	responding	
institutions	alike	is	a	legal,	ethical,	and	human	rights-related	one	now,	too.	
	
How	these	challenges	and	opportunities	are	addressed	has	implications	for	the	present	
and	future	of	all	aspects	of	civ-mil	coordination,	exemplified	by	the	following	problem	areas:	
	
Challenges	Applying	International	Humanitarian	Law	to	Networked	Age:	International	
humanitarian	law	(IHL)	currently	has	serious	gaps	related	to	when	telecommunications	
infrastructure,	online	platforms	and	environments,	and	shared	civ-mil	networks	constitute	
protected	“humanitarian	space”.9	Additionally,	there	is	an	equal	lack	of	clarity	about	what	types	
of	information	provision,	infrastructure-related	activities,	and	other	information	
communication	technology	(ICT)	supported	activities	constitute	humanitarian	aid.	Addressing	
these	gaps	is	essential	to	the	development	of	IHL	compliant	rules	of	engagement	(ROE)	by	
military	actors,	as	well	as	ensuring	the	protection	of	humanitarian	actors	and	affected	
populations.	
                                                
5	Ibid	4.	
6	McDonald,	S.	M.	(2016).	Ebola:	A	Big	Data	Disaster.	Center	for	Internet	and	Society.	
7	Gordon,	G.	(2016)	Monitoring	Conflict	to	Reduce	Violence:	Evidence	from	a	Satellite	Intervention	in	Darfur.	
Columbia	University,	Department	of	Political	Science.	Available	from:	http://grantmgordon.com/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/GG-EoD.pdf		
8	Raymond,	N.,	Harrity.	C.	(April,	2016).	Addressing	the	‘doctrine	gap’:	professionalising	the	use	of	Information	
Communication	Technologies	in	humanitarian	action.	Overseas	Development	Institute.	Humanitarian	Practice	
Network.	
9	Gilman,	D.	et	al.	(2014).	Humanitarianism	in	the	Age	of	Cyberwarfare.	UN	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	
Humanitarian	Affairs.	Policy	and	Studies	Series. 
48
Civilian-Military	Humanitarian	Response	Workshop	Paper 
 
 
The	views	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	author	and	do	not	reflect	the	official	policy	or	position	of	the	Department	of	the	Navy,	
Department	of	Defense,	or	the	U.S.	Government.	 
 
	
Lack	of	Clarity	on	Civ-Mil	Roles	and	Restrictions	around	Connectivity	and	
Communication	Infrastructure	Provision:	Governmental	actors,	including	military	organizations,	
are	increasingly	involved	in	the	provision	of	telecommunications	connectivity	and	infrastructure	
both	during	and	after	crisis	events.	Examples	of	this	role	include	military	operations	in	support	
of	reestablishing	telecommunications	after	natural	disaster	events	in	Nepal,	Philippines,	and	
Haiti.	This	often	vital	role	for	military	organizations		has	complicated	traditional	civ-mil	
coordination	issues	due	to	a	lack	of	clarity	about	when,	where,	how,	and	why	these	roles	should	
be	performed	by	local	communities,	NGOs,	private	sector	industry,	and/or	military	actors.			
	
Need	for	Common	Methodologies	and	Indicators	for	Data	Analysis	in	Specific	Crisis	
Contexts:	Across	both	NGO	and	military	communities	there	exists	an	urgent	need	for	common	
methodologies	and	indicators	specific	to	regularly	repeating	disaster	contexts	to	structure	and	
make	sense	of	digital	information	from	the	crisis-affected	populations.	These	common	
methodologies	and	indicators,	including	common	priority	information	requirements	(PIRs)	from	
public	digital	sources,	are	essential	for	making	sense	of	increasingly	massive	deluges	of	social	
media,	remote	sensing-derived	data,	and	other	forms	of	digital	data.	Most	of	all,	they	are	
essential	for	accurately	assessing	the	humanitarian	needs	of	affected	populations.	
	
No	Best	Practices	for	Matching	Response	Tasks	to	Data	Tools:	Neither	civil	society	actors	
nor	military	organizations	have	common	agreement	about	what	PIRS	specific	to	certain	
disasters	can	best	be	met	with	which	specific	data	source	or	ICT	approach.	This	capacity	can	be	
referred	to	as	“task-to-tool-match”.	Without	best	practices	for	performing	task-to-tool-match,	
civ-mil	coordination	with	affected	populations	and	each	other	around	the	use	of	ICTs	and	digital	
data	will	likely	continue	to	be	highly	challenging.	
	
The	four	gaps	in	current	practice	presented	above	are	not	intended	to	be	
comprehensive	nor	exhaustive.	However,	they	are	examples	of	potential	starting	points	for	
identifying	what	doctrine,	methods,	and	governance	regulations	may	be	required	to	ensure	
that	civ-mil	coordination	related	to	information	collection	and	data	infrastructure	can	
recognize,	respect,	and	include	the	affected	populations	themselves.	
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Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE: A Case Study 
in Civilian-Military Coordination 
__________________________________________ 
 
Paul Reed, CAPT, MD, USPHS 
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Center for Global Health Engagement 
 
The	humanitarian	response	to	the	Ebola	crisis	in	West	Africa	and,	more	specifically,	the	
U.S.	Department	of	Defense	(DoD)’s	part	in	the	international	effort	was	unprecedented	for	
several	reasons.		Operation	UNITED	ASSISTANCE	(OUA),	DoD’s	operational	term	for	the	
response,	presents	as	a	unique	case	study	in	joint	medical	operations	and	civilian-military	
coordination.		While	OUA	did	demonstrate	how	capabilities	from	military	and	civilian	agencies	
can	synergistically	work	together,	the	crisis	also	brought	to	light	for	the	international	
community	how	inadequately	prepared	for	a	large-scale	contagious	outbreak	we	likely	all	are.	
	
On	August	8th	2014,	the	International	Health	Regulations	Emergency	Committee	on	the	
2014	Ebola	outbreak	in	West	Africa	stated	in	a	formal	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	
declaration	that	“It	was	the	unanimous	view	of	the	Committee	that	the	conditions	for	a	Public	
Health	Emergency	of	International	Concern	[had	in	fact]	been	met.”1	This	represented	a	
significant	moment	in	the	epidemic	which	contributed	greatly	to	the	change	in	the	international	
community’s	response	to	the	crisis.		Of	even	greater	note,	in	early	September	of	2014,	in	an	
unprecedented	plea	to	governments	around	the	world,	the	head	of	the	largest,	and	arguably	
most	experienced,	non-governmental	organization	(NGO)	fighting	Ebola	for	decades,	Médecins	
sans	Frontières	(MSF),	implored	United	Nations	(UN)	member	states	to	deploy	civilian	and	
military	teams.		The	crisis	had	reached	unmanageable	proportions	by	the	late	summer	and	was	
predicted	to	escalate	exponentially	in	the	ensuing	months.		The	international	community	
realized	alternative	and	expanded	approaches	to	the	epidemic	had	to	be	brought	to	bear,	
including	applying	military	capabilities	to	the	unprecedented	disaster	born	from	an	infectious	
disease.	
	
The	UN	Office	of	Coordination	for	Humanitarian	Affairs	(UNOCHA)	has	established,	
detailed	guidelines	on	how	and	when	militaries	should	be	engaged	in	disaster	relief.2	Boiled	
down,	there	are	three	basic	concepts	that	have	to	be	entertained	when	foreign	militaries	are	
utilized	in	most	humanitarian	crises.		First,	they	are	leveraged	as	a	means	of	last	resort	under	
urgent	conditions	when	other	civilian	assets	are	not	readily	available.		Second,	the	engagement	
of	militaries	must	be	time-bound	and	of	limited	scope.		Lastly,	militaries	will	always	conduct	
humanitarian	assistance	operations	under	the	auspices	of	civilian	authorities;	namely	the	U.S.	
                                                
1	WHO	declaration;	http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/		
2	UNOCHA	guidelines;	
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oslo%20Guidelines%20ENGLISH%20(November%202007).pdf		
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Agency	for	International	Development	(USAID)	and	its	operational	arm,	the	Office	of	Foreign	
Disaster	Assistance	(OFDA),	in	the	case	of	U.S.	military	efforts.		While	military	involvement	in	
more	familiar	disaster	scenarios	(such	as	earthquakes	or	complex	crises	related	to	civil	unrest)	
are	outlined	in	some	detail	in	the	U.S.	DoD’s	Joint	Publication	(JP)	3-29	on	Foreign	Humanitarian	
Assistance,	response	to	epidemics	is	only	discussed	to	a	limited	degree.3	In	Appendix	E	of	JP	3-
29	where	they	are	referenced,	epidemics	are	defined	as	secondary	to	other	types	of	disasters	
and	ought	to	be	prepared	for	accordingly.	The	request	for	DoD	assets	during	the	Ebola	disaster	
turned	this	planning	consideration	on	its	ear,	as	the	epidemic	was	the	predominant	disaster	
consideration,	itself,	and	only	secondarily	precipitated	the	other	multi-sectoral	dimensions	of	
the	disaster.			
	
The	U.S.	DoD	has	a	broad	spectrum	of	engagement	activities	under	the	umbrella	of	
Global	Health	Engagement	that	encompass	both	emergent	response	capabilities	and	a	wide	
variety	of	capacity-building	endeavors	in	partnership	with	other	nations.		While	the	activities	of	
building	partner	capacity	and	interoperability	as	well	as	cooperative	threat	reduction	may	
enable	more	effective	disaster	response	in	many	instances,	these	activities	are	normally	
defined	within	the	context	of	security	cooperation	engagement	for	the	DoD	as	enabling	tools	
for	our	military	and	do	not	represent	a	separate	declared	mission	set.	Of	all	U.S.	military	global	
health-related	tasking,	only	humanitarian	assistance/disaster	response	is	set	in	policy	as	a	true	
mission	for	the	DoD.		However,	the	elements	of	the	Ebola	response	defined	in	OUA	overlap	
several	domains	of	Global	Health	Engagement	and	fall	well	within	the	purview	of	the	DoD	in	its	
mission	to	deliver	humanitarian	assistance/disaster	relief,	when	called	upon.	
	
The	rate	of	spread	of	Ebola	was	alarming	by	any	measure	and,	towards	the	end	of	the	
summer	of	2014,	it	was	realized	by	the	international	community	that	much	more	needed	to	be	
done	to	curb	the	epidemic	in	West	Africa	and	avoid	further	spread	globally.		It	was	at	this	point	
in	the	epidemic	that	foreign	militaries	were	acknowledged	as	being	necessary	in	order	to	help	
fill	the	gaps	in	civilian	capabilities.		The	newly	appreciated	requirement	for	a	much	larger	
contingent	of	foreign	humanitarian	aid	necessitated	an	expanded	capacity	for	international	
coordination	that	was	addressed	through	the	UN	establishing	UNMEER,	the	UN	Mission	for	
Ebola	Emergency	Response,	itself	an	unprecedented	event.		Prior	to	the	Ebola	epidemic,	the	UN	
had	never	before	stood	up	a	Mission	for	the	purposes	of	managing	a	health-related	crisis.		
When	UNMEER	was	established	on	September	19,	2014,	the	complex	international	emergency	
response	had	expanded	to	involve	sectors	well	beyond	health,	including	governance,	
communications,	food	security	and	an	enormous	logistics	element.		Typical	of	more	common	
major	disasters,	such	as	typhoons	or	earthquakes,	the	UN	cluster	system	of	international	
humanitarian	response	became	employed	in	West	Africa	by	the	fall	of	2014	in	order	to	ensure	
essential	services	were	made	available	to	those	impacted	by	the	epidemic.			
	
                                                
3	JP	3-29;	www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf		
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On	September	16,	2014,	President	Obama	gave	a	speech	to	the	American	public	and	the	
world	which	defined	the	epidemic	in	grave	terms	of	global	security	and	outlined	the	plan	for	an	
enhanced	U.S.	Government	(USG)	relief	effort	going	forward.4	He	clearly	and	in	a	rather	
unprecedented	fashion	stated	the	Ebola	crisis	was	now	considered	a	“national	security	priority”	
for	the	U.S.		Inherent	in	the	President’s	declaration	was	an	implied	shift	in	the	posture	the	USG	
would	be	taking	and	the	types	of	resources,	including	the	military,	which	would	be	brought	to	
bear	to	mitigate	the	growing	security	threat.	
	
By	September	24th,	the	number	of	confirmed	cases	had	reached	7,178	with	3,338	
deaths.		Nearly	half	of	all	confirmed	patients	were	dying	of	the	disease.		As	dire	as	the	situation	
was,	predictions	for	further	spread	of	the	disease	were	even	more	ominous.		There	were	
differences	in	estimates	for	the	epidemic’s	expansion	but	none	were	acceptable	and	most	
agreed	the	epidemic	would	become	impossible	to	control	unless	significant	changes	were	made	
to	the	level	of	international	response.		There	were	many	elements	to	the	response	that	were	
required	in	the	fall	of	2014,	but	it	was	widely	believed	that	a	greatly	enhanced	number	of	Ebola	
Treatment	Unit	(ETU)	beds	and	commensurate	number	of	trained	healthcare	workers	were	
imperative.		At	the	same	time,	second	and	third	order	effects	of	the	epidemic	also	became	
more	apparent	and	worrisome.		Given	the	growing	lack	of	trust	in	governance	systems,	not	to	
mention	the	fear	of	the	disease	and	misunderstanding	about	its	spread,	civil	unrest	grew.		
Security	became	a	paramount	issue	in	some	regions,	which	reflected	back	on	how	humanitarian	
aid	was	able	to	be	provided.		As	well,	and	possibly	of	even	longer-lasting	consequence,	the	
collapse	of	healthcare	systems	across	the	region	lead	to	morbidity	and	mortality	from	
otherwise	manageable	medical	conditions.	
	
USAID/OFDA	stood	up	a	Disaster	Assistance	Response	Team	(DART)	in	August	of	2014	
and	had	already	obligated	millions	of	dollars	of	U.S.	aid	to	a	variety	of	partners	in	order	to	
support	NGO	and	multilateral	organizations	on	the	ground.		Those	USG-funded	partners,	at	the	
time,	included	the	UN	Children’s	Fund	(UNICEF),	Global	Communities,	the	International	
Federation	of	the	Red	Cross	(IFRC),	International	Medical	Corps,	the	International	Rescue	
Committee	(IRC),	the	UN	World	Food	Program	(WFP),	the	WHO	and	the	UN	Humanitarian	Air	
Service.		With	regards	to	the	plan	for	a	greatly	expanded	level	of	military	support	to	the	
humanitarian	response	efforts	in	West	Africa,	President	Obama	indicated	the	establishment	of	
a	Joint	Force	Command	initially	to	be	led	by	U.S.	Army	Africa,	which	oversaw	the	rapidly	
deployed	follow-on	military	assets.		Over	the	ensuing	weeks	and	into	October,	roughly	3,000	
American	servicemen	from	a	myriad	of	DoD	activities	were	deployed	to	the	region.	There	were	
multiple	lines	of	command	and	control	in	the	military’s	engagement	in	West	Africa,	one	which	
followed	traditional	lines	of	authority	for	military	units,	within	the	hierarchy	of	the	DoD	and	the	
other	that	respected	the	civilian	authority	over	all	USG	activities	in	the	region,	reporting	to	the	
USAID/OFDA	lead	and	to	the	U.S.	Ambassador	in	Liberia.	
                                                
4	President’s	speech	on	Ebola;	https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/16/remarks-president-
ebola-outbreak		
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OUA	was	the	first	such	operation	planned	for	and	executed	by	the	U.S.	military	in	
support	of	an	epidemic-driven	humanitarian	mission.		The	operation	was	in	support	of	the	
broader	USG	commitment	to	the	crisis	and	most	of	what	was	being	asked	of	the	military	was	
directly	tied	to	a	number	of	different	USG,	host	government,	NGO,	and	international	partner	
lines	of	effort.		There	were	four	main	areas	that	the	military	was	asked	to	focus	on	including:	1)	
Command	and	Control	for	all	U.S.	military	forces	in	theater;	2)	a	robust	engineering	presence;	
3)	massive	logistics	support	(both	in	the	upfront	delivery	of	supplies	and	personnel	as	well	as	
ongoing	sustainment);	and	4)	a	medical	training	assistance	capability.		These	nested	lines	of	
effort	mapped	to	higher	and	higher	order	strategic	objectives	of	the	USG	response	as	well	as	
that	of	the	Liberian	Government	and	the	entire	international	community.		Those	overarching	
objectives	ultimately	were	defined	in	terms	of	stopping	the	outbreak,	treating	those	infected,	
ensuring	essential	services,	preserving	stability,	and	preventing	additional	outbreaks	of	the	
disease.			
	
Deliverables	from	OUA	were	four	conditions	as	defined	in	the	Execution	Orders	issued	in	
mid-September	2014:		1)	Construction	and	supply	of	an	Ebola	Treatment	Unit	(modified	from	a	
U.S.	Air	Force	Expeditionary	Medical	System	and	staffed	by	the	U.S.	Public	Health	Service);	2)	
Expanded	laboratory	capacity	across	the	region;	3)	Construction	and	supply	of	multiple	ETUs	
(originally	planned	for	as	many	as	17	separate	sites	and	intended	to	be	staffed	by	indigenous	or	
NGO	personnel);	4)	Construction	of,	staffing	and	curriculum	development	for	a	training	
platform	designed	to	train	non-USG	personnel	in	appropriate	personal	protective	equipment	
wear	and	infection	control,	in	order	to	safely	manage	patients	in	ETUs.		Very	specifically,	the	
Chairman	of	the	Joints	Chief	of	Staff	stated	in	a	“red	line”	directive	that	U.S.	military	personnel	
would	not	under	any	circumstances	provide	medical	care	or	evacuation	to	suspected	or	
confirmed	Ebola	Viral	Disease	(EVD)	patients.		From	the	standpoint	of	strategic	interests	
entertained	at	the	highest	levels	of	DoD,	this	was	a	clear-cut	decision.		It	was	a	less	clear	and	
well-understood	decision,	however,	by	the	military	medical	community.		Future	discussion	of	
the	implications	of	U.S.	military	medical	personnel	providing	direct	clinical	care	in	the	midst	of	a	
large-scale,	communicable	disease	outbreak	should	be	entertained	in	light	of	OUA’s	planning	
considerations.		Given	the	expertise	and	clinical	capacity	that	exists	across	the	military	services,	
any	larger	scale	epidemic	event	may	very	well	demand	application	of	that	medical	capacity	in	
concert	with	civilian	responders.	
	
If	one	were	to	consider	the	four	areas	that	the	U.S.	military	was	asked	to	support	in	
OUA,	there	is	little	room	for	argument	that	the	mission	was	successful.		The	logistics	support	to	
a	wide	array	of	humanitarian	partners,	most	of	which	were	civilian	entities,	was	unmatched	and	
proved	invaluable.		The	establishment	and	sustainment	of	a	high-level	care	facility	staffed	by	
U.S.	Public	Health	Service	officers	for	the	treatment	of	EVD	patients,	who	themselves	were	
healthcare	providers	that	fell	ill,	was	made	evident.		Laboratory	capacity	to	diagnose	patients	
and	help	quantify	the	extent	of	the	epidemic	and,	by	extension,	help	with	contact	tracing	and	
control	of	the	spread	of	the	disease,	would	not	have	been	possible	without	OUA.		As	well,	
hundreds	of	civilian	volunteers	were	trained	and	made	ready	to	expand	the	healthcare	
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workforce	in	order	to	further	provide	EVD	care.	Beyond	these	four	major	components	of	OUA	
and	the	specific	deliverables	of	the	operation,	there	were	also	demonstrated	successes	of	the	
manner	in	which	the	military	could	integrate,	collaborate	and	support	a	variety	of	partners	
across	the	spectrum	of	such	a	humanitarian	response.	By	leveraging	the	U.S.	military	via	the	
USAID/OFDA	response	management	system,	civilian	responders	were	bolstered	in	their	
efforts.5	
	
Later	reflection	by	the	international	community	is	studying	the	utility	of	foreign	
militaries	in	general	during	the	crisis,	given	the	eventual	timeline	of	the	Ebola	epidemic.		Recent	
analysis	suggests	the	epidemic	had	turned	in	a	more	positive	direction,	likely	in	response	to	
community-level	interventions	leading	to	favorable	human	behaviors	limiting	the	disease’s	
spread,	at	about	the	time	militaries	were	called	upon	to	provide	additional	support.6	As	well,	
much	of	the	expanded	bed-capacity	in	ETUs	delivered	by	the	militaries’	support	was	never	
utilized.		This	has	raised	some	question	as	to	whether	military	engagement	in	West	Africa,	in	
fact,	helped	alter	the	course	of	the	epidemic.		Whether	the	role	that	the	U.S.	military	and	other	
foreign	militaries	played	contributed	to	the	epidemic’s	fruition	necessitates	deeper	scrutiny,	
however,	and	will	likely	be	debated	for	some	time.	
 
	
	
                                                
5	OUA	JCOA;	http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ebola/OUA_report_jan2016.pdf		
6	Nevin,	Remington	L	(01/01/2016).	"The	timeliness	of	the	US	military	response	to	the	2014	Ebola	disaster:	a	
critical	review".	Medicine,	conflict,	and	survival	(1362-3699),	32	(1),	p.	40.	
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The U.S. Naval War College’s Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Program (HRP), led by the College of 
Operational & Strategic Leadership, was formally established in December 2015 after four years of 
collaborations with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) and other key universities.  HRP’s mission is to 
partner and network with leading universities and humanitarian organizations in order to advance civilian-
military coordination during complex emergencies and natural disasters, and improve the U.S. Navy’s 
effectiveness in conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations through innovative 
education, research, and simulation activities.   
Through extensive partnerships and networking with the humanitarian response community, the HRP aims 
to: 
 Improve the coordination between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), and U.S. and international militaries during natural disasters and complex 
emergencies. 
 Improve the U.S. Navy’s effectiveness in conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster response 
operations. 
 Foster educational opportunities for leaders and practitioners across the humanitarian response 
community. 
 Advance the understanding of rapidly evolving frameworks and information communication 
technologies used in humanitarian responses. 
To achieve these objectives, the HRP engages in the following activities: 
 Network and partner with leading universities and organizations in the humanitarian community. 
 Conduct evidence-based research on civilian-military engagement and coordination during complex 
emergencies, natural disasters, and exercises. 
 Develop and teach innovative educational programs for U.S. and international militaries, civilian 
universities, NGOs, and IGOs. 
 Develop innovative training through humanitarian exercises and simulations for U.S. and international 
militaries, civilian universities, NGOs, and IGOs. 
 Convene various forums to assist a network of international partners and key stakeholders to explore 
challenges and opportunities in civilian-military humanitarian coordination. 
During academic year 2016-2017, HRP will accelerate and expand on its existing partnership with Harvard 
University and collaborations with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
Brown University’s Humanitarian Innovation Initiative, DoD’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management 
and Humanitarian Assistance, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Oxford University’s Humanitarian Innovation Project, 
and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences Center for Global Health Engagement, to other 
universities, NGOs, and IGOs who have expressed an interest in working together in the humanitarian space.   
For more information please contact Professor David Polatty at david.polatty@usnwc.edu or 401-841-1784. 
Civilian-Military 
Humanitarian Response Program 
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n What is United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military 
Coordination?
When an emergency or natural 
disaster creates humanitarian 
needs, many countries deploy 
their military or civil defence 
organizations to respond. 
Bilateral support to disaster-
affected States can also be 
provided through the 
international deployment of 
foreign Military and Civil Defence 
Assets (MCDA). When local and 
international humanitarian 
organizations are also involved 
in that response, it is essential 
that they can operate in the 
same space without detriment to 
the civilian character of 
humanitarian assistance. 
It is for this reason that United 
Nations Humanitarian Civil-
Military Coordination (UN-
CMCoord) facilitates dialogue 
and interaction between civilian 
and military actors—essential for 
protecting and promoting the 
humanitarian principles, avoiding 
competition, minimizing 
inconsistency and, when 
appropriate, pursuing common 
goals.  
UN-CMCoord delivers a 
coherent and consistent 
humanitarian approach to 
military interaction, enhancing a 
broad understanding of 
humanitarian action, and guiding 
political and military actors on 
how best to support that action.  
It helps to develop context-
specific guidance based on 
internationally agreed guidelines, 
and it establishes humanitarian 
civil-military coordination 
structures, ensuring staff 
members are trained to make 
that coordination work. UN-
CMCoord is essential in complex 
emergencies, where the 
involvement of MCDA in 
humanitarian assistance may 
have serious consequences, and 
could impact the perceived or 
actual neutrality, impartiality and 
operational independence of the 
overall humanitarian effort. 
UN-CMCoord in natural disasters
The Guidelines on the Use of 
Foreign Military and Civil 
Defence Assets in Disaster 
Relief (Oslo Guidelines) were 
developed through an 
intergovernmental and inter-
agency process. They seek to 
ensure that foreign MCDA, such 
as helicopters and ships, 
bilaterally deployed in response 
to a natural disaster can support 
and complement the relief 
operation. However, such assets 
must not be used in a manner 
that may compromise principled 
humanitarian action.  
With military assets frequently 
used by Governments to support 
relief efforts, OCHA and its 
humanitarian partners work with 
Member States to incorporate 
the possible use of military 
assets in contingency-planning 
activities. OCHA also engages 
military actors early in 
emergency response operations 
to assist their understanding of 
the humanitarian environment, 
and to ensure coherence and 
consistency in relief efforts to 
avoid inappropriate assistance or 
duplication of effort. 
UN-CMCoord in complex emergencies
In an armed conflict or high-risk 
environment, using military 
assets to support humanitarian 
action becomes more 
complicated, particularly if military 
actors are party to the conflict. 
The Guidelines on the Use of 
Military and Civil Defence Assets 
to Support United Nations 
Humanitarian Activities in 
Complex Emergencies (MCDA 
Guidelines) explain that even 
greater consideration should be 
given to the use of MCDA to 
support humanitarian operations 
in a non-benign environment. 
They seek to preserve the 
impartiality, neutrality and 
operational independence of 
humanitarian actors and 
humanitarian action.  
In complex emergencies, the 
interaction facilitated by UN-
CMCoord aims to facilitate 
humanitarian access, the security 
of humanitarian aid workers and 
operations, and the protection of 
civilians. In certain 
circumstances, mobilizing MCDA 
to support humanitarian 
assistance may be necessary. 
This can take the form of 
engineering support, transport or 
the provision of armed escorts for 
humanitarian convoys. If the 
security environment prevents 
humanitarian access to certain 
areas, military actors may be 
asked to provide direct life-saving 
support, but only until safe 
humanitarian access is restored. 
Some Governments adopt 
strategies that include military 
activities to engender acceptance 
and support from the local 
population. This can form part of 
a comprehensive or whole-of-
Government approach aimed at 
achieving post-conflict stability. 
Without proper coordination, this 
approach can undermine the core 
principles of humanitarian action 
and reduce humanitarian 
operating space.  
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The absence of a clear distinction 
between military activity and 
humanitarian assistance can 
hamper aid delivery, create  
access problems and threaten 
the security of humanitarian 
personnel. Effective UN-
CMCoord ensures humanitarian 
action is seen as distinct, while 
also identifying areas where 
humanitarian civil-military 
interaction is possible. When UN 
peacekeeping forces are present,  
the UN integrated-mission model 
creates a way for peacekeeping 
contingents and humanitarians to 
work alongside each other (see 
OCHA on Message: Integration, 
and the IASC Reference Paper 
on Civil-Military Relationship in 
Complex Emergencies). 
What is OCHA’s role?
UN-CMCoord is a key component 
of OCHA’s core function: 
coordinating humanitarian 
response. In humanitarian 
operations with a military 
presence, OCHA leads the 
establishment and management 
of interaction with military actors. 
This relationship will change 
depending on the type of 
emergency and the roles and 
responsibilities of the military. 
OCHA supports humanitarian and 
military actors through training and 
advocacy on the guidelines to 
achieve timely and appropriate 
use of MCDA in support of 
humanitarian operations and 
humanitarian civil-military  
interaction. OCHA also seeks to 
establish a predictable approach 
to the use of these assets by 
considering their use during 
preparedness and contingency-
planning activities.  
OCHA’s Civil-Military Coordination 
Section (CMCS) supports relevant 
country-, regional- and 
headquarter-level activities. As 
custodian of UN-CMCoord-related 
guidelines, CMCS helps 
humanitarian actors develop 
context-specific guidance tailored 
to a particular emergency. CMCS 
runs a global training programme 
that equips humanitarian and 
military actors with the skills and 
knowledge  
 
necessary to communicate and, 
where appropriate, effectively 
interact with each other. It also 
prepares and deploys personnel 
to act as dedicated UN-CMCoord 
experts in the field.  
CMCS advises the international 
community on humanitarian needs 
related to deploying foreign MCDA 
in support of relief operations or 
humanitarian assistance. This 
takes place through an advocacy 
strategy that complements and 
supports discussions up to the 
Under-Secretary-
General/Emergency Relief 
Coordinator level, coupled with the 
publication of operational 
guidance to the international 
community.
What does OCHA say?
1. Militaries can contribute to 
humanitarian action through their 
ability to rapidly mobilize and 
deploy unique assets and 
expertise in response to 
specifically identified 
requirements. 
4. Coordination between 
humanitarians and military forces 
can range from cooperation to 
coexistence. OCHA manages the 
interaction through UN-CMCoord 
and by applying related 
guidelines. 
2. While military action 
supports political purposes, 
humanitarian assistance is based 
on need and is provided neutrally 
without taking sides in disputes or 
political positions on the 
underlying issues.  
5. Effective and consistent 
humanitarian civil-military 
coordination is a shared 
responsibility, crucial to 
safeguarding humanitarian 
principles and humanitarian 
operating space. 
3. Humanitarians must be 
aware of the issues emanating 
from working with the military to 
ensure that their neutrality, 
impartiality, operational 
independence and the civilian 
character of humanitarian 
assistance are not compromised. 
 
To find out more 
 www.unocha.org/uncmcoord  
 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), 
Rev. 1.1, November 2007 
 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian 
Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines), Rev. 1, January 2006 
 Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies - an IASC Reference Paper, 28 June 2004 
 IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, 27 February 2013 
 United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook, 2008 (under revision)  
Contact: 
Civil-Military 
Coordination 
Section 
OCHA Geneva 
+41 (0)22 917 13 94 
cmcs@un.org 
 
November 2013 
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What are Humanitarian Principles?
All OCHA activities are 
guided by the four 
humanitarian principles: 
humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and 
independence. These 
principles provide the 
foundations for humanitarian 
action. They are central to 
establishing and maintaining 
access to affected people, 
whether in a natural disaster 
or a complex emergency, 
such as armed conflict. 
Promoting and ensuring 
compliance with the 
principles are essential 
elements of effective 
humanitarian coordination. 
Origins and implementation
The humanitarian principles 
are derived from the core 
principles, which have long 
guided the work of the 
International Committee of 
the Red Cross and the 
national Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Societies.1 
The principles’ centrality to 
the work of OCHA and other 
humanitarian organizations 
is formally enshrined in two 
General Assembly 
resolutions. The first three 
principles (humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality) 
are endorsed in General 
Assembly resolution 46/182, 
which was adopted in 1991. 
This resolution also 
established the role of the 
Emergency Relief 
Coordinator (ERC). General 
Assembly resolution 58/114 
(2004) added independence 
as a fourth key principle 
underlying humanitarian 
action. The General 
Assembly has repeatedly 
reaffirmed the importance of 
promoting and respecting 
these principles within the 
framework of humanitarian 
assistance. 
Commitment to the 
principles has also been 
expressed at an institutional 
level by many humanitarian 
organizations. Of particular 
note is the Code of Conduct 
for the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, and non-
governmental organizations 
in disaster relief. The code 
provides a set of common 
standards for organizations 
involved in humanitarian 
activities, including a 
commitment to adhere to the 
humanitarian principles. 
More than 492 organizations 
have signed the Code of 
Conduct.2 Also of note is the 
Humanitarian Charter and 
Minimum Standards in 
Humanitarian Response 
elaborated by the Sphere 
Project.3
1 These are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. See the 
Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, proclaimed in Vienna in 1965 
by the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 
 
2 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct includes principles beyond the core four 
principles endorsed by the General Assembly. In addition, humanitarian organizations may find that some of these 
additional principles have particular meaning in certain contexts (for example, “participation” is often cited as an 
important humanitarian principle). Conceptually, many other principles can be linked back to the four endorsed by 
the General Assembly. 
 
3 See: www.sphereproject.org/handbook/
Humanity 
 
Neutrality 
 
Impartiality 
 
Independence 
 
 
Human suffering must 
be addressed wherever 
it is found. The purpose 
of humanitarian action 
is to protect life and 
health and ensure 
respect for human 
beings. 
 
 
Humanitarian actors 
must not take sides in 
hostilities or engage in 
controversies of a 
political, racial, 
religious or ideological 
nature. 
 
 
Humanitarian action 
must be carried out on 
the basis of need 
alone, giving priority to 
the most urgent cases 
of distress and making 
no distinctions on the 
basis of nationality, 
race, gender, religious 
belief, class or political 
opinions. 
 
 
Humanitarian action 
must be autonomous 
from the political, 
economic, military or 
other objectives that 
any actor may hold 
with regard to areas 
where humanitarian 
action is being 
implemented. 
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OCHA on Message is a reference product that enables staff to communicate OCHA’s position on key issues. 
For more information contact the Reporting Unit at ochareporting@un.org. 
The humanitarian principles 
have practical operational 
relevance. Humanitarian 
action almost always takes 
place in complex political 
and militarized 
environments. Adherence to 
the principles is therefore 
critical in order to distinguish 
humanitarian action from the 
activities and objectives of 
political, military and other 
actors. Promoting 
humanitarian principles and, 
importantly, ensuring that 
humanitarian organizations 
act in accordance with them 
are key to gaining 
acceptance by all relevant 
actors on the ground for 
humanitarian action to be 
carried out. This acceptance 
is critical to ensuring 
humanitarian personnel 
have safe and sustained 
access to affected people. 
Sustained access is, in turn, 
crucial for strengthening the 
implementation of the 
humanitarian principles. For 
example, it allows 
humanitarian actors to 
directly undertake and 
monitor the distribution of 
assistance to people, thus 
ensuring that aid is 
distributed impartially and 
reaches those most in need.
What is OCHA’s role?
OCHA’s mission is to 
mobilize and coordinate 
principled humanitarian 
action. OCHA promotes the 
humanitarian community’s 
compliance with 
humanitarian principles in 
every humanitarian 
response. It does this by 
promoting practical 
compliance measures within 
a Humanitarian Country 
Team through its 
engagement with State and 
non-state actors at all levels, 
and by undertaking and 
contributing to policy 
development within the 
United Nations.
What does OCHA say?
1. Humanitarian 
principles govern  
humanitarian actors’ 
conduct.  
2. Humanitarian actors 
must engage in dialogue 
with all parties to conflict for 
strictly humanitarian 
purposes. This includes 
ongoing liaison and 
negotiation with non-state 
armed groups. 
3. Our compliance with 
humanitarian principles 
affects our credibility, and 
therefore our ability to enter 
into negotiations with 
relevant actors and establish 
safe access to affected 
people. However, it is not 
enough to repeatedly recite 
humanitarian principles. 
Rhetoric must be matched 
by leadership and practice. 
In other words, humanitarian 
actors must “walk the talk”.
4. There are multiple 
pressures on humanitarian 
actors to compromise 
humanitarian principles, 
such as providing 
humanitarian aid as part of 
efforts to achieve political 
ends. Maintaining principled 
humanitarian action in the 
face of these pressures is 
an essential task, but not an 
easy one.  
 
To find out more
 United Nations resolution 46/182: www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm 
 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct: www.ifrc.org 
 
Contact: 
Simon Bagshaw, 
Protection and 
Displacement 
Section 
bagshaw@un.org 
 
June 2012 
 
“The moral 
authority of the 
United Nations 
depends on its 
ability to help 
people most in 
need, and it must 
do so with the 
highest ethical 
standards and 
professionalism.” 
- Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon,  
Council on Foreign 
Relations, 
New York, 
May 2006 
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USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
When a natural disaster or conflict destroys communities, or when 
hunger and disease threaten to spread, people caught in the midst 
of these crises are concerned with survival. Helping them is at the 
core of what USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID/OFDA) does every day, all over the world. 
USAID/OFDA leads and coordinates the U.S. government’s 
humanitarian assistance efforts overseas. The Office responds to 
an average of 65 disasters in more than 50 countries every year, 
ensuring that aid reaches people affected by natural disasters, 
including earthquakes, volcanoes, and floods, as well as slow-onset 
crises, such as droughts and conflicts.
USAID/OFDA has more than 520 staff worldwide, working 
from its Washington, D.C., headquarters and at six regional and 
more than 20 field offices. Its team of humanitarian professionals, 
policy advisors, and technical experts—including infectious 
disease specialists, nutritionists, logisticians, entomologists, 
and hydrometeorological advisors—identify the most urgent 
humanitarian needs, working alongside local governments to assist 
tens of millions of people and save countless lives. USAID/OFDA’s 
strategically located warehouses in Miami, Florida; Pisa, Italy; 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Subang, Malaysia are stocked 
with essential relief supplies, such as emergency shelter materials, 
warm blankets, water treatment systems, and hygiene kits. These 
critical commodities can be transported rapidly to disaster-affected 
areas around the globe. USAID/OFDA also works with the 
international humanitarian community to give vulnerable people 
resources to get back on their feet and strengthen their own ability 
to respond to emergencies.
USAID/OFDA’s speed and flexibility contribute to the 
effectiveness of its response to international crises and help the 
Office lead the U.S. government’s efforts to provide humanitarian 
assistance—on behalf of the American people—in some of the 
world’s most dangerous regions.
Fulfilling more than 50 years 
of its mandate to save lives, 
alleviate human suffering, and 
reduce the social and economic 
impact of disasters, USAID’s 
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance responds to the 
needs of people affected by 
natural disasters and complex 
emergencies around the world. 
This includes the 2015 Nepal 
earthquake, the West Africa 
Ebola outbreak, Typhoon 
Haiyan in the Philippines, the 
2011 Japan earthquake and 
tsunami, as well as ongoing 
crises in countries such as Syria, 
Iraq, South Sudan, and Yemen.
Responding in Times of Crisis
Photo Credit: USAID
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Humanitarian Coordination and Partnerships
USAID/OFDA works strategically with international responders and other donor 
governments to maximize resources to save more lives. The Office taps into a 
vast international network of humanitarian partners through its funding of and 
engagement with UN agencies, donor governments, other international and 
non-governmental organizations, local governments, community organizations, and 
other entities. USAID/OFDA can call on other U.S. government agencies to assist 
with response efforts, whenever needed.
Financials
Approximately 1 percent of America’s federal budget is allocated for foreign 
assistance, and USAID/OFDA’s budget is a mere fraction of that. Humanitarian 
action can mean the difference between life and death for tens of millions of 
people every year. In fiscal year 2015, USAID/OFDA responded to 49 disasters in 
45 countries, providing $1.9 billion in humanitarian assistance.
History of USAID/OFDA 
USAID/OFDA was created in 1964 to 
lead and coordinate the U.S. government’s 
disaster response efforts overseas. 
Following a massive earthquake in the 
former Yugoslavia that killed more than 
1,000 people and a volcanic eruption in 
Costa Rica that destroyed large parts 
of the country, the U.S. government 
determined a need for a lead agency to 
coordinate disaster assistance offered to 
foreign governments and affected people. 
Rooted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 as amended, the President designated 
the USAID Administrator to lead foreign 
disaster response for the U.S. government 
through USAID/OFDA.
Donor 
Governments
Local 
Governments
UN
U.S. 
Government
Non-Governmental 
Organizations
BENEFICIARIES
Saving lives is becoming more difficult as 
crises increase in complexity and magnitude. 
In just over a decade, the number of people 
in need of humanitarian aid has more than 
doubled. Attacks on aid workers are at 
record highs with nearly 330 relief workers 
killed, injured, or kidnapped in 2014. In 
many parts of the world, conflict is the 
new normal, and it shows no sign of ending. 
USAID’s disaster experts are working with 
humanitarian partners around the world 
to overcome these challenges and navigate 
shifting conflict lines to deliver life-saving aid.
USAID/OFDA's share 
of the federal budget
$3.77 Trillion
Total Federal Budget
.05%
@theOFDA
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance
ofdainquiries@ofda.gov
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